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Popper, Karl Raimund (1902–94)Fully updated and revised August 23, 2002
1 Life and works IAN C. JARVIE |
BibliographyList of worksPopper, K.R. (1935) Logik der Forschung (The Logic of Research) , Vienna: Springer; trans. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson, 1959. (Crisp and incisive statement of his classic ideas on philosophy of science and of epistemology. The English translation contains additional material, as explained in §3.) Popper, K.R. (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies, London: Routledge. (A critical introduction to the philosophy of history and of politics that takes Plato, Hegel and Marx to task for their anti-democratic and anti-critical tendencies.) Popper, K.R. (1947a) ‘New Foundations for Logic’, Mind 56: 193–235, with corrections in (1948) 57: 69–70. (A system of natural deduction.) Popper, K.R. (1947b) ‘Logic Without Assumptions’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 48: 251–92. (Investigates the notion of deducibility and the foundations of logic in language.) Popper, K.R. (1957) The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge. (States and rebuts the arguments for belief in inexorable laws of human destiny.) Popper, K.R. (1962) Conjectures and Refutations, London: Routledge. (A wide-ranging collection of essays from the period 1940–62, including several that have become classics.) Popper, K.R. (1972) Objective Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A collection of essays from 1948–72, many being extensions of and alterations to his original philosophy of science and epistemology.) Popper, K.R. (1975) ‘The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions’, in R. Harré (ed.) Problems of Scientific Revolutions, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 72–101. (Popper’s answer to Kuhn’s irrationalist view of scientific revolutions.) Popper, K.R. (1976) Unended Quest, London: Fontana. (Intellectual autobiography; approachable and written with considerable verve.) Popper, K.R. and Eccles, J.C. (1977) The Self and Its Brain, Berlin: Springer. (Joins a fellow Nobelist in proposing an evolutionist and interactionist model of the mind–body problem.) Popper, K.R. (1979) Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie (The Two Basic Problems of the Theory of Knowledge) , Tübingen: Mohr. (All that survives of the book Popper was working on when he turned instead to The Logic of Scientific Discovery.) Popper, K.R. (1982a) Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, London: Hutchinson. (Reflections on problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics; part II of the Postscript.) Popper, K.R. (1982b) The Open Universe, London: Hutchinson. (Statement of Popper’s metaphysical indeterminism; part III of the Postscript.) Popper, K.R. (1983a) Realism and the Aim of Science, London: Hutchinson. (Long commentary on many of the issues originally discussed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery and their reception; part I of the Postscript.) Popper, K.R. and Miller, D. (1983b) ‘A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability’, Nature 302: 687–8. (Proof that evidence, far from supporting a hypothesis, undermines the statement of the evidence and hence the hypothesis itself.) Popper, K.R. (1987) ‘Why Probabilistic Support is Not Inductive’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, A321: 569–91. (Restatement and elaboration of Popper and Miller (1983).) Popper, K.R. (1990) A World of Propensities, Bristol: Thoemmes. (The propensity interpretation of probability statements developed as a full-blown metaphysics.) Popper, K.R. (1992) In Search of a Better World, London: Routledge. (Speeches and address to general audiences.) Popper, K.R. (1994a) Knowledge and the Body–Mind Problem, London: Routledge. (Essays from his last thirty years on the mind–body problem and other matters.) Popper, K.R. (1994b) The Myth of the Framework, London: Routledge. (Essays from his last thirty years on the philosophy of physical and social science.) Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) (1974) The Philosophy of Karl Popper, La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Two volumes, containing Popper’s intellectual autobiography, 33 critical essays and ‘Replies to My Critics’, as well as a complete bibliography up 1973.) Adorno, T.W. et al. (1976) The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology , London: Heinemann. (Contains Popper’s ‘The Logic of the Social Sciences’ and ‘Revolution or Reform?’.) References and further readingAckermann, R. (1976) The Philosophy of Karl Popper , Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. (A review and positive evaluation of Popper’s philosophy of science.) Ackermann, R. (1993) A Philosopher’s Apprentice, Amsterdam: Rodopi. (An idiosyncratic reminiscence of studying with Popper.) Albert, H. (1985) Treatise on Critical Reason , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Critical rationalism as expounded by a leading German Popperian.) Andersson, G. (1994) Kuhn’s, Lakatos’s, and Feyerabend’s Criticism of Critical Rationalism, Leiden: E.J. Brill. (Critical rationalism defended against its major critics.) Bartley, W.W., III (1962) The Retreat to Commitment, New York: Knopf. (An influential attempt to improve upon Popper’s critical rationalism.) Bartley, W.W., III (1976–82) ‘Critical Study: The Philosophy of Karl Popper: Parts I, II and III’, Philosophia 6: 463–94; 7: 676–716; 12: 121–221. (A sympathetic critical essay on the Schilpp volume (1974).) Berkson, W. and Wettersten, J. (1984) Learning from Error , La Salle, IL: Open Court. (An investigation into the origin of Popper’s ideas in his early psychological researches.) Bunge, M. (ed.) (1964) The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy , New York: Free Press. (The first collection of essays discussing Popper’s ideas.) Burke, T.E. (1983) The Philosophy of Popper , Manchester: Manchester University Press. (Critical commentary on a few selected topics. Popper is said to have set the agenda in a number of fields. Wittgenstein gets the worse of some comparative discussions.) Gellner, E. (1985) ‘Positivism Against Hegelianism’, in Relativism and the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press. (A robust critical review of the metaphysical issues between Popper and his idealist critics.) Hacohen, M.H. (1993) ‘The Making of the Open Society: Karl Popper, Philosophy and Politics in Interwar Vienna’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University. (A lengthy attempt to relate Popper’s work to the Viennese context.) Hattiangadi, J.N. (1978–9) ‘The Structure of Problems, Parts I and II’, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 8, 345–65; vol. 9, 49–76. (Argues that solving problems is a sufficient aim for science and that the history of science is lines of debate.) Jarvie, I.C. (1972) Concepts and Society, London: Routledge. (A Popperian philosophy of the social.) Jarvie, I.C. and Shearmur, J. (eds) (1996–7) Philosophy of the Social Sciences, special issues, 26 (4) and 27 (1). (In celebration of the 50th anniversary of the publication of The Open Society and its Enemies containing eight papers on the origins, impact and contemporary relevance of Popper’s great book.) Johansson, I. (1975) A Critique of Karl Popper’s Methodology , Stockholm: Akademiforlaget. (A vigorous assault on Popper’s methodology.) Leblanc, H. (1989) ‘Popper’s Formal Contributions to Probability Theory’, in Perspectives on Psychologism, The Hague: Nijhoff, 341–67. (An important evaluation of Popper’s technical contribution.) Levinson, P. (ed.) (1982) In Pursuit of Truth, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities. (A second collective volume in Popper’s honour.) Magee, B. (1973) Popper, London: Fontana/Collins. (The first comprehensive exposition for the general reader.) Miller, D. (1994) Critical Rationalism: Restatement and Defence , La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Sharp and forceful, including discussion of critical issues surrounding truth and probability.) Munz, P. (1985) Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge, London: Routledge. (Wittgenstein’s theory of knowledge is criticized as relativist, Popper’s evolutionary view is defended.) O’Hear, A. (1980) Karl Popper, London: Routledge. (Critical account that treats Popper timelessly and within the received framework of academic philosophy and, unsurprisingly, vindicates Wittgenstein.) O’Hear, A. (ed.) (1995) Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Fifteen Royal Institute of Philosophy lectures that range widely over Popper’s work.) Pralong, S. and Jarvie, I.C. (eds) (1997) Popper’s Open Society After 50 Years, London: Routledge. (The proceedings of a Prague conference originally organized by Ernest Gellner, to assess Popper’s work in the context of the opening up of former Iron Curtain countries.) Radnitzky, G. (1968) Contemporary Schools of Metascience , Goteborg: Akademiforlaget. (A survey of the field from a Popperian ‘criticist’ perspective.) Schroeder-Heister, P. (1984) ‘Popper’s Theory of Deductive Inference and the Concept of a Logical Constant’, History and Philosophy of Logic 5: 79–110. (Reconstructs Popper’s ideas on logic so as to take account of criticism.) Simkin, C. (1993) Popper’s Views on Natural and Social Science, Leiden: Brill. (An accurate and mildly critical account by a colleague from the New Zealand days.) Stove, D. (1981) Popper and After. Four Modern Irrationalists, Oxford: Pergamon. (A scathing, if less than persuasive, attack.) Wettersten, J. (1992) The Roots of Critical Rationalism, Amsterdam: Rodopi. (Argues that tensions in Popper’s work and among his followers go back to the philosophical and psychological traditions he was attempting to reconcile.) Williams, D.E. (1989) Truth, Hope and Power: The Thought of Karl Popper , Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press. (An ambitious commentary that perhaps overreaches its grasp.) Wisdom, J.O. (1952) Foundations of Inference in Natural Science, London: Methuen. (One of the earliest and best expositions of Popper’s ideas in English.)
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