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Ramsey, Frank Plumpton (1903–30)
1 Mathematics D.H. MELLOR |
BibliographyList of worksRamsey, F. P. (1931) The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, ed. R.B. Braithwaite, London: Routledge & Keegan Paul. (Referred to in §1. The first published collection of Ramsey’s papers.) Ramsey, F. P. (1990a) Philosophical Papers, ed. D. H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Contains all Ramsey’s major philosophical papers. By permission of Cambridge University Press, this entry draws on the editor’s Introduction to this book. Page references for the quotations from Ramsey’s work refer to this edition; the dates given are those of first publication or, if published posthumously, of composition.) Ramsey, F. P. (1990b) ‘Weight or the Value of Knowledge, ed. N.-E. Sahlin, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41: 1–3. (Previously unpublished note calculating the value of collecting evidence for the truth or falsity of a proposition.) Ramsey, F. P. (1990c) Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics, ed. M.C. Gavalotti, Naples: Bibliopolis. (Previously unpublished notes.) Ramsey, F. P. (1991) On Truth, ed. N. Rescher and U. Majer (1991), Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Previously unpublished notes for an uncompleted book on truth and related matters.) References and further readingArmstrong, D.M. (1983) What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 5.4. (Referred to in §4. Argues that Ramsey’s first theory of laws of nature is the best Humean account of them and then attacks it.) Chihara, C.S. (1980) ‘Ramsey’s Theory of Types: Suggestions for a Return to Fregean Sources’, in Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F. P. Ramsey, ed. D.H. Mellor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 21–47. (Referred to in §1. Defends a Fregean reading of Ramsey’s theory of types.) de Finetti, B. (1937) ‘Foresight: its Logical Laws, its Subjective Sources’, ch. VI, trans. H. E. Kyburg, in Studies in Subjective Probability, eds H. E. Kyburg Jr and H. E. Smokler (1964), New York: Wiley, 93–158. (Referred to in §2. Argues on operationalist grounds – see Operationalism – against objective interpretations of probability even in physics.) Jeffrey, R.C. (1983) The Logic of Decision, 2nd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ch. 3. (Referred to in §2. Interprets Ramsey’s ‘Truth and Probability’ as a prescriptive subjective decision theory.) Keynes, J.M. (1921) A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan. (Referred to in §2. Gives the interpretation of probability as a measure of a logical relation of partial entailment attacked by Ramsey and later revived by Carnap.) Lewis, D. (1972) ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I, ed. N. Block, London: Methuen, 1980, 207–22. (Referred to in §5. Uses Ramsey sentences to define mental states by their causes and effects.) Mellor, D.H. (ed.) (1980) Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F. P. Ramsey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Contains eleven original essays on different aspects of Ramsey’s philosophy.) Mellor, D.H. (1991) ‘Properties and Predicates’, Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 170–82. (Referred to in §5. Uses the Ramsey sentence of all laws to determine what empirical universals exist.) Sahlin, N.-E. (1990) The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A comprehensive introduction to Ramsey’s philosophy and also to his mathematics and economics, not dealt with in this entry.) Sahlin, N.-E. (1991) ‘Obtained by a Reliable Process and always Leading to Success’, Theoria 57: 132–49. (Referred to in §2. Develops and defends Ramsey’s reliabilist theory of knowledge.) Whitehead, A.N. and Russell, B. (1927) Principia Mathematica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn. (Referred to in §1. The basis of Ramsey’s attempt to reduce mathematics to logic.) Whyte, J.T. (1990) ‘Success Semantics’, Analysis 50 (3): 149–57. (Referred to in §3. Gives the truth conditions of beliefs as the conditions in which the actions they combine with desires to cause achieve the objects of those desires.) Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge, §4.46. (Referred to in §1. The theory of tautology used by Ramsey to strengthen Principia’s definition of mathematical propositions.)
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