Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved May 04, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/gettier-problems/v-1
References and further reading
Barker, J. (1976) ‘What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt You?’, The American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4): 303–308.
Chisholm R. (1966) Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 3rd edn, 1989.
Feldman, R. (1974) ‘An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1): 68–69.
Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23 (6): 121–123; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 35–38.
Klein, P. (1971) ‘A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy 68 (16): 471–482.
Klein, P. (1981) Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Defends an improvement upon Klein (1971) mentioned in §2 above; relates defeasibility to issues about certainty and scepticism.)
Lehrer, K. (1965) ‘Knowledge, Truth, and Evidence’, Analysis 25 (5): 168–175; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 55–66.
Lehrer, K. (1974) Knowledge, London: Oxford University Press.
Lehrer, K. (1979) ‘The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge’, in G. Pappas (ed.) Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht, Boston, MA, and London: Reidel, 65–78.
Lehrer, K. (1990) Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO and San Francisco, CA: Westview Press.
Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T., Jr. (1969) ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’, The Journal of Philosophy 66 (8): 225–237; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 55–66.
Moser, P. (1989) Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Presents a defeasibility analysis related to Barker‘s; contains a critique of the solution to the Gettier problem proposed in Shope (1981).)
Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Plantinga, A. (1993a) Warrant: the Current Debate, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A thorough survey and critique of contemporary attempts to develop a fourth condition of knowing, which includes counterexamples to Chisholm’s account.)
Plantinga, A. (1993b) Warrant and Proper Function, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pollock, J.L. (1986) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pollock, J.L. (1992) ‘Reply to Shope’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2): 411–413.
Shope, R.K. (1981) The Analysis of Knowing: a Decade of Research, Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.
(Surveys and assesses analyses of knowing presented after the period covered by Slaght (1977), especially in regard to the Gettier problem; offers a characterization of the problem and sketches a solution mentioned above in §4.)
Shope, R.K. (1992) ‘Propositional Knowledge’, in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds) A Companion to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, 396–401.
(A brief handbook survey of main types of analyses of knowing prior to that offered in Plantinga (1993b), with some consideration of their relation to the Gettier problem.)
Slaght, R.L. (1977) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?: A Selective Critical Survey of Recent Work’, Philosophy Research Archives 3: 1–135.
Shope, Robert K.. Bibliography. Gettier problem, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P022-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/gettier-problems/v-1/bibliography/gettier-problems-bib.
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