Functionalism

References and further reading

	Block, N. (1980) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, London: Methuen, vol. 1. (The section on functionalism contains many important articles, including early versions of functionalism by H. Putnam, D. Lewis and D.M. Armstrong. See also Block’s Introduction to this section, and the difficulties he raises in ‘Troubles with Functionalism’.)
	Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 2, 1984. (Classic statement and defence of dualism.)
	Lewis, D. (1980) ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, London: Methuen, 1980, vol. 1; repr. with a postscript in D. Lewis Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Blackwell 1983, vol. 1. (Lewis’ ‘mixed’ version of functionalism.)
	Millikan, R. (1986) ‘Thoughts without Laws’, Philosophical Review XCV: 47–80. (Argues that mental states should be analysed in terms of biological purposes rather than causal roles.)
	Nagel, T. (1974) ‘What is it like to be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review 83: 435–450, repr. in Block (1980). (Argues that the subjective character of experience is not captured by physicalist theories.)
	Papineau, D. (1991) ‘Teleology and Mental States’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXV: 33–54. (Argues that functionalism without teleology cannot account for representation.)
	Ramsey, F.P. (1931) ‘Theories’ in Foundations of Mathematics, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (The original statement of Ramsey’s account of theoretical terms.)
	Rosenthal, D.M. (1991) The Nature of Mind, London: Oxford University Press. (Good general collection on contemporary philosophy of mind. Papers by W.G. Lycan and E. Sober argue for ‘microfunctionalism’ (Lycan) and ‘teleofunctionalism’ (Lycan and Sober).)
	Shoemaker, S. (1984) Identity, Cause and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (This collection of Shoemaker’s papers includes discussions of the different species of functionalism and of the inverted spectrum and absent qualia objections.)