Knowing how to

References and further reading

	*Brown, D.G. (1970) ‘Knowing How and Knowing That, What’, in O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds) Ryle – A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. (Impressive early attempt to sort out the syntax and semantics of ‘knows how to’.)
	Carr, D. (1979) ‘The Logic of Knowing How and Ability’, Mind LXXXVIII: 394–409. (Discussion of the different logics of what the author calls two senses of ‘can’: that of knowing how to, and that of physical power.)
	*Carr, D. (1981) ‘Knowledge in Practice’, American Philosophical Quarterly XVIII: 53–61. (Sequel to Carr (1979).)
	*Craig, E.J. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Attempts to illuminate the use of ‘knows how to’ by presenting it as a response to the need for an ‘instructor’, or person from whom an ability can be learnt. See especially the closing paragraphs of §VI and all of §XVII.)
	Ginet, C. (1975) Knowledge, Perception and Memory, Boston: Reidel. (See pp. 6–9: reasons for regarding knowing how to as a type of knowing that – and a valuable discussion of Ryle (1949).)
	*Herrigel, E. (1953) Zen in the Art of Archery, trans. R.F.C. Hull, London: Arkana. (Famous and highly readable account of the author’s experience of studying archery with a Zen master.)
	Hintikka, J. (1975) ‘Different Constructions in Terms of the Basic Epistemological Verbs’, in The Intentions of Intentionality, Boston: Reidel, 1–25. (See especially pp. 11–14: there are two senses of ‘knowing how to’, characterized respectively as ‘skill’ and ‘knowing the way’; argues that the latter is prior to the former. Includes a discussion of Ryle (1949).)
	Lewis, D.K. (1983) ‘Postscript to ‘‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’’ ‘, in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, 130–132. (Lewis’ well-known riposte to the so-called ‘knowledge argument’ about phenomenal qualia – but stated here in terms of abilities without any mention of knowing how to.)
	*Lewis, D.K. (1990) ‘What Experience Teaches’, in W.G. Lycan (ed.) Mind and Cognition: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 499–519. (The reply to the ‘knowledge argument’ again, as in Lewis (1983), now apparently stated in terms of a contrast between knowing that and knowing how to.)
	*Perry, J. (1979) ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, No¬s 13: 3–21. (Classic paper introducing the notion of a first-personal mode of presentation alluded to in Stanley and Williamson (2001).)
	*Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 2nd edn, 1962; repr. London: Routledge, 1988. (Discusses the related topics of skills – Ch. 4 and passim – and tacit knowledge – Chs 5–7 and passim. Not easy to extract much clear doctrine from this book.)
	*Rumfitt, I. (2003) ‘Savoir Faire’, The Journal of Philosophy C: 158–166. (Response, using data from French and Russian studies, to Stanley and Williamson (2001).)
	*Ryle, G. (1946) ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society XLVI; repr. in Collected Papers, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1971, vol. 2, 212–225. (The paper that started the current discussion of knowing how to.)
	*Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson & Co. (Chapter 2, ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, is the principal location for Ryle’s treatment of the present topic. The index gives three other references for ‘knowing how’, but two of them – pp. 265 and 269 – are, on the face of it, examples of knowing how rather than knowing how to.)
	Ryle, G. (1967) ‘Teaching and Training’, in R.S. Peters (ed.) The Concept of Education, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; repr. in Collected Papers, vol. 2, 451–464. (Ryle on the related notions of teaching and learning-how-to.)
	*Stanley, J. and Williamson, T. (2001) ‘Knowing How’, The Journal of Philosophy XCVIII: 411–444. (Argues, calling on syntactic and semantic theory, that knowing how to is a subspecies of knowing that.)