DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-N040-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved September 22, 2021, from

References and further reading

  • Adams, R.H. (1979) ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’, Journal of Philosophy 76: 5–26.

    (A difficult but seminal article on particulars as irreducible to shareable properties.)

  • Armstrong, D.M. (1980) ‘Identity Through Time’, in P. van Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause, Dordrecht: Reidel, 67–78.

    (An accessible defence of particulars as aggregates of timeslices, as discussed above in §5.)

  • Armstrong, D.M. (1989) Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, CA and London: Westview Press.

    (An introductory exposition of a late twentieth century resuscitation of a roughly Aristotelian theory distinguishing particulars from universals.)

  • Campbell, K. (1989) Abstract Particulars, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (An accessible defence of properties particularized, as discussed in above in §4. Useful for further references.)

  • Eliot, C.W. (1910) Sacred Writings, vol. 2, in The Harvard Classics, New York: Collier, vol. 45.

    (Contains source material translated from the Milindapañha and from the Visuddhimagga, mentioned in §1 above.)

  • Goodman, N. (1951) The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (A difficult but important landmark on particulars as bundles of properties or as aggregates of timeslices, and of properties particularized, and of other ways of construing particulars.)

  • Goodman, N. and Quine, W.V. (1947) ‘Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 12: 105–122.

    (A difficult but important work defending nominalism, and also laying the groundwork for mereology or the theory of aggregates, relevant to §5 above.)

  • Horner, I.B. (1963) Milinda’s Questions, Sacred Texts of the Buddhists, Oxford, Pali Text Society, vol. 22.

    (Source material on the Buddhists’ treatment of persisting individuals as mere aggregates of momentary things in ‘Questions of King Milinda and Nāgasena’ mentioned above in §1.)

  • Lewis, D.K. (1976) ‘Survival and Identity’, in A.O. Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 17–40.

    (A difficult but clear exposition of a theory of persons as aggregates of timeslices.)

  • Molesworth, W. (1837–45) Elements of Philosophy, vol. 4 of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, London: J. Bohn.

    (Part 2, chapter 2: 135 contains a famous passage on the ship of Theseus, mentioned in §5 above.)

  • Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    (An accessible and entertaining exposition of a theory of persons as aggregates of timeslices, and of supposed consequences that this might have for moral theory.)

  • Quine, W.V. (1953) ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’, Proceedings of the XI International Congress of Philosophy 14: 65–81; repr. in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, New York: Random House, 1966, 155–174.

    (A classic attack on Aristotelian or any other sort of essentialism.)

  • Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen.

    (A transcendental justification of a roughly Kantian sort, for a common-sense theory of individuals as irreducible to properties.)

  • Williams, D.C. (1966) The Principles of Empirical Realism, Springfield, IL: Charles Thomas.

    (A classic defence of a theory of properties particularized.)

Citing this article:
Bigelow, John C.. Bibliography. Particulars, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N040-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2021 Routledge.

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