DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P045-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved July 02, 2022, from

References and further reading

  • Cohen, S. (1988) ‘How to be a fallibilist’ in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 91–123.

    (This contributor’s treatment of scepticism.)

  • Cornman, J. (1980) Scepticism, Justification, and Explanation, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    (Defends inference to the best explanation response – see §4.)

  • Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in E. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds) The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1955.

    (Meditation I contains a classic statement of the sceptical problem.)

  • Dretske, F. (1970) ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–1023.

    (Argues against the deductive closure principle for knowledge.)

  • Klein, P. (1981) Certainty, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

    (Detailed defence of modus ponens fallibilism.)

  • Moore, G.E. (1959) ‘Certainty’, in W. Doney (ed.) Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967.

    (Classic statement of modus ponens fallibilism.)

  • Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Detailed defence of a theory that endorses condition S – see chapter 3.)

  • Unger, P. (1975) Ignorance, New York: Oxford University Press.

    (Influential defence of scepticism.)

  • Vogel, J. (1987) ‘Tracking, Closure and Inductive Knowledge’, in S. Luper-Foy (ed.) The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

    (Critical discussion of condition S.)

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1921) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

    (Interesting treatment of solipsism.)

Citing this article:
Cohen, Stewart. Bibliography. Scepticism, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P045-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
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