Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved June 06, 2020, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/scepticism/v-1
References and further reading
Cohen, S. (1988) ‘How to be a fallibilist’ in J.
Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 91–123.
(This contributor’s treatment of scepticism.)
Cornman, J. (1980) Scepticism, Justification, and Explanation, Dordrecht: Reidel.
(Defends inference to the best explanation response – see §4.)
Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in E.
Haldane and G.R.T.
Ross (eds) The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1955.
(Meditation I contains a classic statement of the sceptical problem.)
Dretske, F. (1970) ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy
(Argues against the deductive closure principle for knowledge.)
Klein, P. (1981) Certainty, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Detailed defence of modus ponens fallibilism.)
Moore, G.E. (1959) ‘Certainty’, in W.
Doney (ed.) Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967.
(Classic statement of modus ponens fallibilism.)
Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Detailed defence of a theory that endorses condition S – see chapter 3.)
Unger, P. (1975) Ignorance, New York: Oxford University Press.
(Influential defence of scepticism.)
Vogel, J. (1987) ‘Tracking, Closure and Inductive Knowledge’, in S.
Luper-Foy (ed.) The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
(Critical discussion of condition S.)
Wittgenstein, L. (1921) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans.
Pears and B.F.
McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
(Interesting treatment of solipsism.)
Citing this article:
Cohen, Stewart. Bibliography. Scepticism, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P045-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/scepticism/v-1/bibliography/scepticism-bib.
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