Scepticism

References and further reading

	Cohen, S. (1988) ‘How to be a fallibilist’ in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 91–123. (This contributor’s treatment of scepticism.)
	Cornman, J. (1980) Scepticism, Justification, and Explanation, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Defends inference to the best explanation response – see §4.)
	Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in E. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds) The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1955. (Meditation I contains a classic statement of the sceptical problem.)
	Dretske, F. (1970) ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–1023. (Argues against the deductive closure principle for knowledge.)
	Klein, P. (1981) Certainty, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Detailed defence of modus ponens fallibilism.)
	Moore, G.E. (1959) ‘Certainty’, in W. Doney (ed.) Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. (Classic statement of modus ponens fallibilism.)
	Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Detailed defence of a theory that endorses condition S – see chapter 3.)
	Unger, P. (1975) Ignorance, New York: Oxford University Press. (Influential defence of scepticism.)
	Vogel, J. (1987) ‘Tracking, Closure and Inductive Knowledge’, in S. Luper-Foy (ed.) The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. (Critical discussion of condition S.)
	Wittgenstein, L. (1921) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. (Interesting treatment of solipsism.)