Objectivity

References and further reading

	Ayer, A. J. (1936) Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz. (Chapter 6 contains a classic statement of expressivism about ethics.)
	Blackburn, S. (1984) Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Chapters 5 and 6 develop a modern version of expressivism.)
	Blackburn, S. (1993) Essays in Quasi-realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A collection of Blackburn’s central papers on his preferred form of expressivism, quasi-realism.)
	Blackburn, S. (1998) Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Further development of the themes of Blackburn’s 1984 and 1993.)
	Boghossian, P. (1989)The Rule-Following Considerations’, Mind 98 (392): 507–549. (Comprehensive survey of the literature on the rule-following considerations.)
	Brock, S. and Mares, E. (2007) Realism and Anti-realism, Stocksfield: Acumen. (A very useful introductory survey of issues about objectivity and realism.)
	Dummett, M. (1978) Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth. (Influential antirealist book which contains much discussion about the objectivity of truth.)
	Dummett, M. (1993) The Seas of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Collects together Dummett’s most important papers on realism, truth and objectivity.)
	Eklund, M. (2007) ‘Fictionalism’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism/ (A useful survey with an extensive bibliography.)
	Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Mentioned in §1 above. Highly sophisticated development of a form of expressivism, norm-expressivism.)
	Gibbard, A. (2003) Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Develops a form of expressivism using the idea that normative judgments express ‘planning states’.)
	Hale, R. (1993) ‘Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes?’, in J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds) Reality, Representation and Projection, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Mentioned in §1 above. Excellent survey of the difficulties faced by expressivism.)
	Hume, D. (1739–40) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. (Book III is generally held to contain a classic denial of the objectivity of morals, although philosophers disagree as to whether Hume was a subjectivist or an expressivist.)
	Joyce, R. (2001) The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Develops a form of revolutionary fictionalism about morality.)
	Joyce, R. (2005) ‘Moral Fictionalism’, in M. Kalderon (ed.) Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Further defence of revolutionary moral fictionalism.)
	Kalderon, M. (2005a) Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (An outline of a form of hermeneutic moral fictionalism.)
	Kalderon, M. (2005b) Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A superb collection of papers by leading philosophers on various forms of fictionalism.)
	Leiter, B. (1997) Objectivity in Law and Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Collection of articles on the nature and role of objectivity in law and morality.)
	Locke, J. (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1975) (Book 1, ch. 8 contains the historical precursor of the primary–secondary quality distinction mentioned in §2 above.)
	Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin. (A classic statement of an error-theory of morality.)
	McDowell, J. (1995) Mind and World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Argues for quietism about objectivity.)
	Miller, A. (1998) ‘Response-dependence, Rule-following, and McDowell’s Debate with the Anti-realists’, European Review of Philosophy 3: 175–197. (A critical discussion of Wright and McDowell on the objectivity of meaning).
	Miller, A. (2002) What Is the Manifestation Argument?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83: 352–383. (Critical discussion of the main argument used by Dummett and Wright against the objectivity of truth.)
	Miller, A. (2004) ‘Differences with Wright’, Philosophical Quarterly 54: 595–603. (Critical discussion of Wright’s antirealist approach to objectivity.)
	Rosen, G. (1994)’‘Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What Is the Question?’, in M. Michael and J. O’ Leary-Hawthorne (eds) Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (A sophisticated defence of quietism.)
	Sinclair, N. (2009) ‘Recent Work on Expressivism’, Analysis Reviews 69 (1): 136–147. (A very useful ‘state of the art’ survey with a good bibliography.)
	Smith, M. (1994) The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Excellent study of the problems surrounding the objectivity of morals.)
	Wright, C. (1992) Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Further development of antirealism. Chapter 6 contains a useful discussion of quietism.)
	Wright, C. (1993) Realism, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd edn. (Develops antirealist views on objectivity. The introduction provides an excellent survey: probably the best place to start a study of objectivity.)
	Wright, C. (2001) Rails to Infinity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (A collection of Wright’s central papers on rule-following and the objectivity of meaning.)
	Wright, C. (2003) Saving the Differences, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (A collection of Wright’s key papers on the themes of Wright(1992.)
	Wright, C. (2007) ‘Rule-Following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question’, Ratio, new series, 20: 481–502. (A discussion of Wittgenstein’s quietism about meaning and rule-following.)