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Value, ontological status of

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-N066-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-N066-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved October 23, 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/value-ontological-status-of/v-1

Article Summary

We evaluate persons, characters, mental states, actions, inanimate objects and situations using very abstract terms such as ‘good’, ‘unjust’ and ‘beautiful’, and more concrete terms, such as ‘courageous’, ‘cruel’ and ‘crass’, drawn from fields such as aesthetics, ethics, politics and religion. Do these evaluations ascribe value properties to the entities evaluated? If so, what are these properties like? If not, what are we doing when we evaluate?

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Citing this article:
Oliver, Alex. Value, ontological status of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N066-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/value-ontological-status-of/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2019 Routledge.

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