DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-N066-1
Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved September 30, 2023, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/value-ontological-status-of/v-1
Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved September 30, 2023, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/value-ontological-status-of/v-1
Article Summary
We evaluate persons, characters, mental states, actions, inanimate objects and situations using very abstract terms such as ‘good’, ‘unjust’ and ‘beautiful’, and more concrete terms, such as ‘courageous’, ‘cruel’ and ‘crass’, drawn from fields such as aesthetics, ethics, politics and religion. Do these evaluations ascribe value properties to the entities evaluated? If so, what are these properties like? If not, what are we doing when we evaluate?
Citing this article:
Oliver, Alex. Value, ontological status of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N066-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/value-ontological-status-of/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2023 Routledge.
Oliver, Alex. Value, ontological status of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N066-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/value-ontological-status-of/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2023 Routledge.