Perfectionism

1. Broad versus narrow perfectionism

Despite being ignored by English-speaking philosophers for much of the twentieth century, perfectionism is one of the leading moralities of the Western tradition. It is wholly or in part the morality of, among others, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Brentano, T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross.

Defined broadly, perfectionism is a teleological morality with an objective theory of the human good (see Good, theories of the; Teleogical ethics; Welfare). As a teleological morality, it is centred on claims about the good and characterizes right action in terms of the good, for example, as that which will result in the most good possible (see Right and good). Its structure, therefore, is similar to that of utilitarianism (see Utilitarianism). But whereas utilitarians traditionally characterize the good subjectively, as consisting in pleasure, the fulfilment of desires, or ‘happiness’, perfectionists value states or activities of humans other than happiness (see Happiness; Hedonism). They hold that, for example, knowledge, achievement, and aesthetic appreciation are good apart from any pleasure or satisfaction they bring. Their presence in a life makes that life better independently of how much they are wanted or enjoyed, and their absence impoverishes it even if it is not a source of regret.

Defined more narrowly, perfectionism is based on an objective theory of a special kind. It holds that the good consists at bottom in developing one’s ‘nature’, or realizing a ‘true self’ (see Human nature §1): certain properties are central to one’s identity, and one’s good consists in developing these properties to a high degree. In some versions of this narrower perfectionism the relevant identity belongs to one as an individual, but more commonly it is shared with all human beings, so that, for example, the properties distinctive of or essential to humans determine the human good. If knowledge and achievement are good, on this view, it is because they realize aspects of human nature.

Narrow perfectionism has often been accompanied by dubious non-moral views, for example, that developing human nature is each human’s ‘function’ or purpose, or that premises about human nature entail conclusions about the good. But it is best considered apart from these views, as making only the moral claim that a being’s good is determined by its nature. If this claim can be sustained, narrow perfectionism has two attractive features. Its central ideal of developing human nature is intuitively appealing in itself, or at least has been found so by philosophers from Aristotle to Marx and Nietzsche. And this ideal offers to unify what might otherwise be an unordered list of objective goods. But narrow perfectionism faces serious objections. It must provide a more precise definition of human nature that both retains the intrinsic appeal of the narrow ideal and includes only properties that in themselves seem worth developing. This dual test is not passed by the commonest definitions of human nature, since humans have both distinctive properties (such as killing things for fun) and essential properties (such as occupying space) that do not seem morally valuable. Indeed, many contemporary philosophers doubt whether, especially given the findings of evolutionary biology, any true theory of human nature can ground plausible claims about value (see Evolution and ethics). If they are right, narrow perfectionism is no longer a viable option. The most plausible morality of this kind is not a narrow but a merely broad perfectionism, one that makes objective claims about the good without grounding them in human nature.