Perfectionism

4. Perfectionism and politics

Applied to political questions, perfectionism uses the same teleological standard as for evaluating acts by individuals: the best government, leader or law is the one that most promotes perfection. Though this is a classical view of politics, some critics worry that it threatens the values of liberty and equality (see Equality; Freedom and liberty). Will a state committed to objective goods not force citizens into activities it deems valuable, thereby violating individual liberty? Instead of distributing resources equally, will it not concentrate them on a small elite with the greatest talents for excellence? Some perfectionisms, for example, those of Plato, Aristotle and Nietzsche, substantiate these worries, but others, notably Marx’s and Green’s, endorse liberty and equality. They do so because of specific features of their structure and theories of value.

Perfectionism can most simply value liberty by making the free choice of one’s life-activities itself an objective good (see Autonomy, ethical). This perfectionist valuing of choice lies behind the classical liberalisms of Wilhelm von Humboldt and J.S. Mill. In addition, perfectionism can hold, as Green did, that the value of any activity depends crucially on the attitude with which it is done, and that state coercion not only cannot produce good attitudes but is likely to discourage them. These arguments leave room for non-coercive state action to promote perfection, such as subsidizing good activities or in other ways encouraging them.

Some perfectionisms are anti-egalitarian because of their structure. Thus, Nietzsche makes the goal of individual and state action the greatest perfection, not of all, but of the few best individuals. The most attractive perfectionisms, however, give equal weight to gains in perfection by all people. And they will support roughly equal distributions of resources if they can make the following empirical claims: that people’s overall talents for perfection do not differ immensely, and that many highly valuable perfections require only modest resources. Some theories of the good, such as Plato’s and Aristotle’s, make these empirical claims unlikely, but others, such as Green’s, support them. If perfection is largely a matter of people’s attitudes, then many inexpensive activities can have value, and each person has many chances to have some worthwhile talent. There is further support for equality if the perfections of different people enhance each other. If each person’s development requires a similar development for others, as Marx held, then all will do best in a society where all have the resources for excellence. In short, though some versions of perfectionism do deny liberty and equality, others, arguably the most plausible, endorse them.