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Perfectionism

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-L070-1
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DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L070-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved April 23, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/perfectionism/v-1

5. Perfectionism in pluralism

Perfectionist ideas can figure not only in a pure morality but also in a pluralist one where they are weighed against competing ideas about, for example, utility or rights (see Moral pluralism). One possibility is a teleological pluralism with a duty to promote not only perfectionist goods but also utilitarian ones such as pleasure. J.S. Mill’s theory, with its distinction between higher and lower pleasures, fits this mixed teleological pattern (see Mill, J.S. §9). Another pluralist morality combines a teleological duty to promote what is good with non-teleological duties about killing, truth-telling and the like, as Ross’s theory does. In these pluralist contexts perfectionist ideas make a distinctive contribution, grounding both self-regarding and other-regarding duties to pursue objective goods such as knowledge and achievement. The central perfectionist thought is that these states are good independently of any connection with happiness and that a prime moral duty is to promote them in oneself and in others.

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Citing this article:
Hurka, Thomas. Perfectionism in pluralism. Perfectionism, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L070-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/perfectionism/v-1/sections/perfectionism-in-pluralism.
Copyright © 1998-2024 Routledge.

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