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Brentano, Franz Clemens (1838–1917)

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-DC009-1
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DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-DC009-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved March 28, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/brentano-franz-clemens-1838-1917/v-1

6. Ethics and the theory of value

Brentano’s moral philosophy is based upon his theory of value. His theory of value, in turn, is a theory of ‘intrinsic value’, about what is good in itself, or good as an end, about what is bad in itself, or bad as an end, and more generally about the relation of intrinsic preferability. Brentano’s theory of intrinsic value is based upon the analogy he believes to hold between intellectual and emotive phenomena. One may take an intellectual stand towards an object of thought, thereby having a positive belief or a negative belief about that object; one may ‘affirm’ the object or ‘deny’ it. One may also take an emotive stand with respect to the object, in which case one ‘loves’ the object or one ‘hates’ it. Brentano uses ‘love’ and ‘hate’ somewhat broadly to cover what we might call, respectively, ‘pro-feelings’ and ‘anti-feelings’.

What does it mean to say that a thing is intrinsically good or intrinsically bad? Brentano appeals again to the concept of correctness which is central to his theory of knowledge and truth. To say that a thing is intrinsically good, according to Brentano, is to say that it is ‘correct to love’ that thing as an end; and to say that a thing is intrinsically bad is to say that it is ‘correct to hate’ it as an end. Brentano believed that we can be immediately aware of the correctness of certain of our emotive attitudes, just as we can be immediately aware of the correctness (that is, the truth) of certain of our intellectual attitudes. In each case, the correctness consists in a relation of appropriateness or fittingness between the attitude and its object.

Brentano constructs a hierarchy of values in which pleasure plays a subordinate role. The principal bearers of intrinsic value, he claims, are conscious states. Some but not all conscious states are intrinsically good. And every conscious state as a conscious state contains some part that is intrinsically good. Every correct judgment is intrinsically good; so too is every correct emotion and every enrichment of our intellectual life. Since every intrinsic evil is itself a conscious state, there can be no intrinsic evil that does not include some intrinsic good. Among the things that are ‘predominantly bad’ are error, pain, every unjustified act of hate (especially the hatred of that which is good), and every unjustified act of love (especially of that which is bad). Sensory pleasure is, as such, intrinsically good.

A complete account of Brentano’s value theory would take into consideration a detailed analysis of aesthetic value, and also Brentano’s views on instrumental or practical value, which are broadly utilitarian.

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Citing this article:
Chisholm, Roderick M. and Peter Simons. Ethics and the theory of value. Brentano, Franz Clemens (1838–1917), 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-DC009-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/brentano-franz-clemens-1838-1917/v-1/sections/ethics-and-the-theory-of-value.
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