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Contents

Biographical

Kripke, Saul Aaron (1940–)

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-DD085-1
Versions
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-DD085-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved April 25, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/kripke-saul-aaron-1940/v-1

List of works

  • Kripke, S.A. (1959) ‘A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1): 1–14.

    (Proves that a formula is a theorem of quantified modal logic if and only if it is valid in Kripke’s semantics. Very technical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1963) ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Acta Philosophica Fennica 16: 83–94; 53–355.

    (Presents Kripke’s semantics for modal logic. Partly informal, partly technical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1971) ‘Identity and Necessity’, in M.K. Munitz (ed.) Identity and Individuation, New York: New York University Press, 135–164.

    (An early presentation of key ideas treated in Kripke 1980.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1972) ‘Naming and Necessity’, in D. Davidson (ed.) Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel, 2nd edn, 253–355.

    (Treats the topics of Kripke 1980.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1975) ‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’, Journal of Philosophy 72 (19): 690–716.

    (Sketches a theory of truth designed to avoid paradox while minimizing truth-value gaps. Very technical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1976) ‘Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantification?’, in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds) Truth and Meaning, London: Oxford University Press, 325–419.

    (Discussions of the substitutional interpretation of quantification and evaluation of its philosophical significance. Difficult, often technical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1977) ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: 255–276.

    (On the potential divergence of what a speaker intends to refer to from what the speaker’s words refer to, and whether the words are ambiguous. Largely nontechnical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1979) ‘A Puzzle About Belief’, in A. Margalit (ed.) Meaning and Use, Dordrecht: Reidel, 239–283.

    (Discusses a vital problem concerning the interplay of reference and belief. Difficult, not very technical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1980) Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (The key source for Kripke’s views on proper names, reference, identity, necessity, essentialism and related topics. Difficult but largely nontechnical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Discusses scepticism, rule-following and Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’. Nontechnical.)

  • Kripke, S.A. (1986) ‘A Problem in the Theory of Reference: The Linguistic Division of Labor and the Social Character of Naming’, in Philosophy and Culture (Proceedings of the 17th World Congress of Philosophy), Montreal: Editions du Beffroi, Editions Montmorency, 241–247.

    (Discusses a problem about how proper names refer.)

References and further reading

  • Branch, T. (1977) ‘New Frontiers in American Philosophy’, The New York Times Magazine, August 14.

    (Evidence of Kripke’s popular fame, with discussion of his early work.)

  • French, P.A., Uehling, T.E., Jr. and Wettstein, H.K. (1986) Studies in Essentialism, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11.

    (A valuable collection of twenty-six essays on essentialism and related topics by noted authors. Includes an abundance of useful references. The essays vary in techicality and difficulty.)

  • Jubien, M. (1993) Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Offers a theory of proper names and an account of essentialism that differ sharply from Kripke’s, despite a fundamental agreement at the intuitive level. Difficult but not overly technical.)

  • Lewis, D.K. (1968) ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’, Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–126.

    (A rather technical presentation of an account of modality criticized in Kripke 1980. Requires an understanding of quantified modal logic.)

  • Lewis, D.K. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (A philosophical elaboration of the key ideas of Lewis 1968, and related topics. Difficult but not overly technical.)

  • Marcus, R.B. (1993) Modalities, New York: Oxford University Press.

    (Collects Marcus’s essays on modality, modal logic, and other topics. Of special interest are essays 1, 14, and appendix 1A, a discussion among the author, Quine, Kripke, T. McCarthy, and D. Follesdal, which followed a 1962 presentation of essay 1. Essay 1 is quite technical, essay 14 and appendix 1A are less so.)

  • Plantinga, A. (1974) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (Contains an influential account of possible worlds and a general theory of modality. Difficult and fairly technical.)

  • Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Offers criticisms of modal notions that are responded to in Kripke 1980. Difficult and sometimes technical.)

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Citing this article:
Jubien, Michael. Bibliography. Kripke, Saul Aaron (1940–), 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-DD085-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/kripke-saul-aaron-1940/v-1/bibliography/kripke-saul-aaron-1940-bib.
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