Nozick, Robert (1938–2002)

2. Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Anarchy, State, and Utopia begins with the words: ‘Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)’ (1974: ix). His conclusions fall into three parts: a defence of the minimal state; a theory of economic justice; and a utopian vision of society.

Nozick claims – in opposition to the anarchist – that the existence of a minimal state (the ‘night-watchman’ state of classical liberalism) is consistent with individual (negative) natural rights to life, liberty and property. To defend this claim he uses an ‘invisible hand’ argument to show how the state could emerge.

In Locke’s state of nature (see Locke, J. §10), individuals have a natural right of self-defence and a right to punish those who violate their rights. Nozick argues that such people would rationally band together in groups to enforce their claims of justice. Commercial protection agencies would follow and, Nozick argues, such agencies would merge or join federations until a single ‘dominant protection agency’ exists. This yields what Nozick terms an ultra-minimal state, for not all individuals need join. However, Nozick believes that the dominant protection agency has the right to prohibit individuals from exercising their natural right to punish, provided it compensates them for this by offering protection services. Thus, ultimately the protection agency would satisfy two conditions Nozick believes sufficient to constitute a state: it (virtually) monopolizes legitimate coercion within its territory, and it offers protection to almost all. By showing that a minimal state could come into existence without violating rights, Nozick believes he has demonstrated that at least a minimal state is justified.

The centrepiece of Nozick’s libertarianism, however, is his theory of distributive justice. Nozick argues that the more-than-minimal state – a welfare state, for example – would violate people’s rights. Nozick’s own theory of justice – the entitlement theory – falls into three parts: principles of justice in the initial acquisition of property; in transfer; and in rectification, which simply concerns how to rectify violations of the first two principles (see Justice §5; Property §3). The principle of justice in acquisition is not fully stated, although Nozick remarks that it must include one element taken from Locke: an individual’s appropriation must not worsen any third party’s condition. Nozick instead gives most attention to the principle of justice in transfer, which essentially states that a transfer is just if, and only if, it is voluntary. His contention is that only his theory properly respects liberty. All others, he claims, are defeated by his notorious ‘Wilt Chamberlain’ example.

In this example, Nozick claims that any ‘pattern’ of holdings – each according to their needs, for example – will inevitably be destroyed by the free and voluntary trading and gift-giving behaviour of individuals. The only way of enforcing a pattern involves ‘constantly interfering’ in individuals’ lives: either by prohibiting certain transfers or by intrusively redistributing property. Even a system of taxation and welfare payments is rejected by Nozick on the grounds that it forces some people to labour for the benefit of others, without choice or reward. Accordingly, taxation is ‘on a par with forced labour’. Hence, any state more extensive than the minimal state will violate individual rights to liberty: ‘The socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults’ (1974: 163).

The third part of Nozick’s project is to show that the minimal state is ‘inspiring as well as right’. Here he makes it clear that libertarianism is intended to provide a set of background rights and duties for society, but people may enter into whatever voluntary arrangements they wish. Thus Nozick argues that a group may set up any type of community they wish, provided they have the resources and do not coerce others to join them. Thus libertarianism is viewed as a ‘framework for utopia’ in which individuals can act out their own model of utopia, in company with like-minded others (see Libertarianism §§1, 3).

Nozick’s views have generated an enormous critical literature. Critics claim that the entire weight of his position stands on the justification of the initial acquisition of individual property rights. And on this point Nozick is particularly weak, doing so little to state and defend his principle of justice in acquisition. Critics have also doubted that Nozick can justify even the minimal state, given the very strong assumptions of individual freedom with which he starts. Nozick has not published a response to these criticisms.