Putnam, Hilary (1926–2016)

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-Q117-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved October 16, 2021, from

List of works

Most of Putnam’s papers, and all of those cited in the text, are included in the collections – Philosophical Papers, volumes I–III and the two volumes edited by J. Conant. Where the title has been changed, the text cites the title appearing in these volumes.

  • Putnam, H. and Benacerraf, P. (1964) Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

    (Introduction by the editors. Includes classic works in the foundations of mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics by leading mathematicians such as Hilbert, Brouwer and Gödel.)

  • Putnam, H. (1971) Philosophy of Logic, New York: Harper & Row.

    (Putnam argues for a realist position on the problem of the existence of mathematical objects.)

  • Putnam, H. (1975a) Philosophical Papers, vol. I, Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    (This volume contains papers on the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science. It includes ‘It Ain’t Necessarily So’, which develops the notion of relative necessity, ‘An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Geometry’, which argues against a conventionalist interpretation of the theory of relativity, and ‘The Logic of Quantum Mechanics’, advocating quantum logic.)

  • Putnam, H. (1975b) Philosophical Papers, vol. II, Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge, and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    (This volume includes one of Putnam’s major contributions to the philosophy of language, ‘The Meaning of Meaning’, as well as ‘Explanation and Reference’ and ‘The Refutation of Conventionalism’, all of which expound a realist conception of meaning. It also includes papers in the philosophy of mind, in particular papers introducing functionalism, such as ‘Philosophy and Our Mental Life’ and ‘The Mental Life of Some Machines’.)

  • Putnam, H. (1978) Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    (Part One contains the John Locke Lectures, Oxford 1976, which explore the interconnections between explanation, theories of truth, and realism. Part Two marks the change in Putnam’s position from realism to ’internal realism’.)

  • Putnam, H. (1981) Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge, and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    (The book propounds ’internal realism’, arguing that it avoids the difficulties of metaphysical realism on the one hand, and scepticism on the other.)

  • Putnam, H. (1983) Philosophical Papers, vol. III, Realism and Reason, Cambridge, and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    (This volume reworks many of the themes previously dealt with by Putnam in the light of his new position. It includes ‘Models and Reality’, which pursues the implications of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem; ‘Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine’, which rejects some sceptical consequences of Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s positions; ‘Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized’, which argues against naturalism; and ‘Quantum Mechanics and the Observer’, which argues for perspectivism, and abandons the earlier realist interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of quantum logic.)

  • Putnam, H. (1987) The Many Faces of Realism, La Salle, IL: Open Court.

    (The Paul Carus Lectures, Washington 1985. Putnam’s ’internal realism’ is examined here in the context of American pragmatism, in particular Peirce’s philosophy.)

  • Putnam, H. (1988) Representation and Reality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Putnam reconsiders functionalism, his early philosophy of mind, in the light of his views on meaning, and his critique of naturalism.)

  • Putnam, H. (1990) Realism with a Human Face, ed. J. Conant, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (A collection of essays by Putnam, selected and introduced by the editor. The essays in this volume are divided into three groups: metaphysics; ethics and aesthetics; studies in American philosophy. The rejection of the fact/value dichotomy is a central theme of this collection.)

  • Putnam, H. (1992) Renewing Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (This book grew out of the Gifford Lectures, St Andrews 1990. It takes issue with scientism in several areas such as artificial intelligence and ethics, while maintaining the possibility of a cognitive relation to reality.)

  • Putnam, H. (1994) Words and Life, ed. J. Conant, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (A collection of essays by Putnam, selected and introduced by the editor. Some of the essays in this volume, such as ‘Rethinking Mathematical Necessity’ reflect Putnam’s growing attraction to the later Wittgenstein. Others discuss pragmatism, logical positivism, the philosophy of mind and the role of philosophy in our lives.)

  • Putnam, H. (1995) Pragmatism, Cambridge, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell.

    (First published in Italian as Il Pragmatismo: Una Questione Aperta, Rome, Bari: Gius Laterza & Figli Spa, 1992. Putnam’s version of pragmatism. Includes a bibliography.)

References and further reading

  • Hill, C.S. (1992) ‘The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam’, Philosophical Topics 20 (1).

    (Essays by D.A. Anderson, A. Bilgrami, N. Chomsky, J. Conant, B. Dreben, G. Ebbs, R. Healey, G.J. Massey, J. McDowell, R.W. Miller, and A. Sidelle, and replies by Putnam.)

  • Clark, P. and Hale, B. (1994) Reading Putnam, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (Essays by S. Blackburne, G. Boolos, M. Dummett, M. Hallett, C. Fuhl and C. Glymour, M. Redhead, T. Ricketts, D. Wiggins, and C. Wright, and replies by Putnam.)

Citing this article:
Ben-Menahem, Yemima. Bibliography. Putnam, Hilary (1926–2016), 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-Q117-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2021 Routledge.

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