Rorty, Richard McKay (1931–2007)

2. Metaphilosophy

Rorty takes the three models of philosophy most attractive to contemporary philosophers to be the scientistic (Carnap), the poetic (Heidegger) and the political (Dewey); he endorses the last as most congenial to pragmatism. Philosophers should emulate the moral virtues which scientific communities have exemplified, but give up belief in ‘scientific method’ as well as philosophical method. They should foster the invention of new metaphors that is the work of poets and prophets, creating new vocabularies and social hopes; but philosophers have no special mission to be either poets or prophets. Philosophy should be hermeneutic, helping different areas of culture to make contact with each other and to sort out conflicts, just as liberal politics tries to find a working relationship among the different and conflicting desires and hopes at play in the world (see Hermeneutics). Its most important task now is to clear away past bad philosophy and bad ideas that are getting in the way of thinking usefully about, and doing, what can be done to make people happier.

As his metaphilosophy suggests, Rorty’s characteristic philosophical positions are what might be called ‘anti-isms’, positions defined primarily by what they deny. In epistemology he endorses anti-foundationalism, in philosophy of language anti-representationalism, in metaphysics anti-essentialism and anti- both realism and antirealism, in meta-ethics ironism (see Foundationalism; Essentialism; Realism and antirealism). None of these is a theory but, rather, a collection of considerations for the rejection of theorizing in these areas.