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Epistemology

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-P059-3
Versions
Published
2021
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P059-3
Version: v3,  Published online: 2021
Retrieved January 29, 2022, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/epistemology/v-3

References and further reading

  • Benton, M. (2021) ‘Knowledge Norms’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/kn-norms/#H2. (Provides an overview of the literature on knowledge norms of belief, assertion, practical reasoning and action.)

  • Chisholm, R. (1977) Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edn, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. (An extended presentation and defence of Chisholm’s theory of knowledge. Includes his presentation of the ‘Gettiered Perception’ case from §6.)

  • Chisholm, R. (1982) The Foundations of Knowing, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Collects several of Chisholm’s essays on epistemology, including ‘The Problem of the Criterion’.)

  • Craig, E. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Defends an account of knowledge grounded on a genealogical account of the concept of knowledge. Proposes that the central purpose of the concept of knowledge is to flag good informants and actionable information.)

  • Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23 (6): 121–123. (Original presentation of Gettier’s cases against the JTB account of knowledge.)

  • Goldman, A. (1976) ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ Journal of Philosophy 73: 771–791. (Presents a partial analysis of perceptual knowledge. Presents the ‘Fake Barn Country’ case from §3.)

  • Greco, J. (2003) ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’, in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 111–134. (Argues for virtue-theoretic diagnosis of Gettier cases and a virtue-theoretic solution to the value problem.)

  • Greco, J. (2010) Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (An extended defence of the thesis that knowledge is a kind of achievement.)

  • Greco, J. (2020) The Transmission of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Argues for an antireductionist account of knowledge transmission. Applies the notion of joint action from action theory to argue that knowledge transmission through testimony can be understood as a kind of joint achievement.)

  • Kvanvig, J. (2003) The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (First monograph entirely devoted to the value problem. Argues that it is understanding, rather than knowledge, that is of special epistemic value.)

  • Kelp, C. (2019) Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. New York and London: Routledge. (A book-length defence of an approach that combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology.)

  • Lackey, J. (2007) ‘Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’, Synthese 158: 345–361. (Argues credit theories of knowledge, a kind of virtue theory, cannot account for testimonial knowledge.)

  • Miracchi, L. (2015) ‘Competence to Know’, Philosophical Studies 172: 29–56. (Argues against traditional virtue epistemology in favour of an approach that combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology.)

  • Millar, A. (2010) ‘Knowledge and Recognition’, in D. Pritchard, A. Millar and A. Haddock (eds), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. (Criticizes the traditional project of defining knowledge by providing necessary, sufficient and informative conditions. Includes a knowledge first approach to perceptual knowledge.)

  • Pritchard, D. (2010) ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, in D. Pritchard, A. Millar and A. Haddock (eds), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. (An extended defence of Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology. Defends the claim that understanding, but not knowledge, is especially valuable, since only the former counts as an achievement.)

  • Shope, R.K. (1981) The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Surveys a range of early responses to Gettier problems.)

  • Sosa, E. (1980) ‘The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge’, in Studies in Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, vol. 5. (The paper that introduced the concept of intellectual virtue into the contemporary literature.)

  • Sosa, E. (2007) A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (An extended defence of Sosa’s version of virtue epistemology.)

  • Williamson, T. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (An extended defence of Williamson’s knowledge first approach to epistemology. Also argues for a stability-based account of the value of knowledge.)

  • Zagzebski, L. (1996) Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, New York: Cambridge University Press. (An extended defence of Zagzebski’s version of virtue epistemology. Defends the claim that epistemic evaluation is a species of moral evaluation and that intellectual virtues have an analogous structure to moral virtues.)

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Citing this article:
Greco, John. Bibliography. Epistemology, 2021, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P059-3. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/epistemology/v-3/bibliography/epistemology-bib.
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