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Ayer, A.J. (1936) Language, Truth, and Logic, New York: Dover, 2nd edn, 1946. (An accessible defence of extreme empiricism about meaning and knowledge.) |
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Bon
Jour, L. (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (A defence of coherentism about empirical justification; see §2 above.) |
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Carruthers, P. (1992) Human Knowledge and Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (An accessible treatment of issues about the sources of empirical knowledge.) |
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Goldman, A.I. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Defends an account of justification and knowledge in terms of reliable belief-forming processes, discussed in §3 above.) |
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Kant, I. (1781/1787) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp
Smith, London: Macmillan, 1963. (Classic statement of the a priori–a posteriori and analytic–synthetic distinctions; see especially the introduction, §§I–IV.) |
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Kripke, S.A. (1980) Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell, and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (An influential treatment of the a priori–a posteriori distinction.) |
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Lewis, C.I. (1946) An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, LaSalle, IL: Open Court. (A classic statement of foundationalism that acknowledges a central role for a ‘given’ element in empirical justification.) |
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Moser, P.K. (1989) Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A defence of a foundationalist approach to empirical knowledge that acknowledges empirical justification by non-belief sensory experiences; see §3 above.) |
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Moser, P.K. (1993) Philosophy After Objectivity, New York: Oxford University Press. (An examination of the kinds of warrant available for claims to objective knowledge, knowledge of the external world.) |
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Moser, P.K. and Vander Nat, A. (1987) Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1995. (Classical and contemporary selections bearing on the conditions for a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Includes selections from Ayer, Kripke, Lewis, Quine and Russell, among others.) |
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Quine, W.V. (1953) From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2nd edn, 1961. (Includes ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, an influential defence of epistemic holism and challenge to the analytic–synthetic distinction.) |
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Yolton, J. (1984) Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid, Oxford: Blackwell. (A survey of classical modern approaches to the nature of perceptual experience.) |