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Brand, M. and Walton, D. (1976) Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Varied collection of accessible articles.) |
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Danto, A. (1965) ‘Basic Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 141–48. (Original source for the idea of basicness: see above §2.) |
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Davidson, D. (1971) ‘Agency’, in R.
Binkley
(eds) Agent, Action and Reason, Toronto, Ont.: Toronto University Press; repr. in Davidson (1980). (Defends a coarse-grained account of actions’ individuation, working with the idea of actions as a species of events which are ‘intentional under some description’.) |
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Davidson, D. (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (The author’s ideas in the philosophy of action are presented (in the five essays in part 2) in the context of an account of events (part 1) and an account of the psychological (part 3).) |
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Donagan, A. (1987) Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Readable introduction, introducing more background than many standard works on ‘action theory’.) |
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Ginet, C. (1990) On Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Good, elementary, if not easy, introduction, defending a ‘medium-grained account of actions’ individuation and a phenomenologically-based version of volitionalism. Also addresses some questions about human freedom.) |
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Goldman, A. (1970) A Theory of Human Action, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Defends a fine-grained account of the individuation of act-tokens, or tropes. Considers some issues connected with responsibility.) |
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Hornsby, J. (1980) Actions, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Attends to distinctions between notions of basicness (in chapters 5 and 6), and to different versions of doctrines about actions’ parts and causes (in chapters 3 and 4).) |
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Mill, J.S. (1843) A System of Logic, London: Routledge, vols 7 and 8, 1991. (One source of a componential volitionalist view.) |
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O’
Shaughnessy, B. (1980) The Will, 2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Detailed and sustained defence of a psychophysical conception of willed behaviour, paying close attention to phenomenology.) |
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Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, ch.3. (Source of objections to dualistically conceived volitionalism.) |
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Searle, J. (1983) Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Chapter 3 explores the relation between intentions and actions using a conceptual apparatus developed for analysing problems of intentionality.) |