(A journal founded to promote analytical philosophy, whose style remains a characteristic expression of this kind of philosophy.)
A. (1662) La logique, ou l’art de penser, Paris; trans.
Dickoff and P.
James, The Art of Thinking, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.
(In chapter 4 Arnauld commends Descartes’ method of inquiry as the ‘method of analysis’.)
Austin, J.L. (1962) Sense and Sensibilia, ed.
Warnock, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Austin uses his analysis of the language of perception to criticize sense-datum theories of perception.)
Ayer, A.J. (1936) Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz.
(A classic statement of logical positivism: chapter 2 proclaims that philosophy can only be analysis).
Ayer, A.J. (1959) Logical Positivism, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
(A useful collection of writings from the logical positivists.)
Baldwin, T.R. (1990) G.E. Moore, London: Routledge.
(Chapters 1 and 2 discuss Moore’s break with idealism and early conception of analysis; in chapter 7 his later conception of philosophical analysis is discussed critically.)
Bergmann, G. (1945) ‘A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness’, Mind new series 54: 193–226.
(While criticizing the logical positivist account of the intentionality of consciousness, Bergmann describes the positivists as ‘analytical philosophers’.)
Butler, R.J. (1962, 1965) Analytical Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 2 vols.
(A characteristic expression of the kind of linguistic analysis that was practised in Oxford in the early 1960s.)
Carnap, R. (1932) ‘Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache’, Erkenntnis
2: 219–241; trans.
Pap, ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language’, in Ayer
(Carnap’s statement of the logical positivist thesis that philosophy can only be the logical analysis of language.)
Carnap, R. (1937) The Logical Syntax of Language, trans.
Smeaton, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(Carnap’s further development of his logical positivist programme for the analysis of language.)
Cohen, G.A. (1978) Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(An application of the methods of analytical philosophy to the study of Marxism; the starting-point of ‘Analytical Marxism’.)
Descartes, R. (1701) Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Amsterdam: P. & J. Blaeu; trans.
Stoothof and D.
Murdoch, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
(Rules 6 and 12 prescribe the discerning intuition of ‘simple natures’.)
Davidson, D. (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(A collection of Davidson’s papers in which he develops his conception of a ‘theory of meaning’ and its place in philosophy.)
Davidson, D. (1986) ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, in E.
LePore (ed.) Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Blackwell.
(A paper in which Davidson substantially qualifies the conception of a theory of meaning advanced in Davidson 1984.)
Dummett, M.A.E. (1993) The Origins of Analytical Philosophy, London: Duckworth.
(Dummett’s most extended discussion of his theses that the mark of analytical philosophy is the priority it assigns to the philosophy of language, and that Frege is the founder of analytical philosophy so conceived.)
Dummett, M.A.E. (1976) ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? II’ in G.
Evans and J.
McDowell (eds) Truth and Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 67–115.
(Dummett’s fullest statement of his conception of a ‘theory of meaning’ which, for him, is the core of a philosophy of language.)
Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(Evans here argues that the theory of reference for language needs to be situated within a broader understanding of mental content, thus challenging Dummett’s ‘priority of language’ thesis.)
Frege, G. (1892) ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik
100: 25–50; trans.
Black as ‘On Sense and Reference’, in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed.
Black and P.
Geach, Blackwell: Oxford, 1952.
(Frege’s classic statement of his sense/reference distinction which has become a central feature of analytical philosophy.)
R. (1988) Enlightened Empiricism, Tampa, FL: University of Southern Florida Press.
(A robust defence of Quine’s sceptical arguments.)
Hacking, I. (1975) Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(A discussion of the idea of linguistic analysis and its development in the period 1950–75; the 1992 edition of Rorty (1967) contains as an afterword a critical discussion (‘Ten Years After’) of this book by Rorty.)
Hylton, P. (1990) Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(An account of the development of Russell’s philosophy over the period 1900–12.)
Kant, I. (1781/1787) Critique of Pure Reason, trans.
Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 2nd edn, 1933.
(The standard translation of the Critique.)
Locke, J. (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed.
Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
(A classic application of the method of analysis in the context of an empiricist theory of ideas.)
Montefiore, A. and Williams, B. (1966) British Analytical Philosophy, London: Routledge.
(An influential collection of papers in which the post-war Oxford conception of linguistic analysis is propounded and discussed.)
G.E. (1899) ‘The Nature of Judgment’, Mind new series 8: 176–193.
(Moore’s critique of the idealist theory of judgment, in which he propounds his analytic programme.)
G.E. (1903) Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Moore’s presentation of analytical ethics, resting on the thesis that the concept of intrinsic value is ‘unanalysable’.)
G.E. (1925) ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in J.H.
Muirhead (ed.) Contemporary British Philosophy (second series), London: Allen & Unwin, 193–223; repr. in T.
Baldwin (ed.) G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, London: Routledge, 1993, 106–133.
(Contains Moore’s later view that the difficult task for philosophy is not to defend common sense, but to analyse it.)
Passmore, J. (1957) A Hundred Years of Philosophy, London: Duckworth; 2nd edn repr. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
(Much of the second half of the book provides a survey of the development of analytical philosophy, which is carried further in the 1966 Penguin edition.)
Plato (c.380–367) Theaetetus, trans.
McDowell, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
(Socrates’ dream (201d–202c) marks the first appearance of the method of analysis.)
Quine, W.V. (1953) From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(A collection of Quine’s early papers including ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ in which he launches his radical critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction.)
Quine, W.V. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(In chapter 2 Quine launches his notorious thesis of the indeterminacy of translation.)
Quine, W.V. (1990) Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(A lucid recent statement by Quine of his views about meaning and evidence.)
Rorty, R.M. (1967) The Linguistic Turn, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
(A collection of essays, expository and critical, on philosophy as ‘linguistic analysis’ with an excellent bibliography; the 1992 edition has two retrospective essays by Rorty in which he looks back critically at the pretensions of linguistic analysis.)
Rorty, R.M. (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
(In chapter 6 Rorty argues that the time has come to move beyond analytical philosophy, and in chapter 8 he describes post-analytical philosophy as the ‘conversation of mankind’.)
Russell, B.A.W. (1903) The Principles of Mathematics, London: Allen & Unwin
(Russell’s first systematic attempt at a programme of logical analysis.)
Russell, B.A.W. (1905) ‘On Denoting’, Mind
14: 479–493; repr. in Logic and Knowledge, ed.
Marsh, London: Allen & Unwin, 1956, 41–56.
(Russell’s presentation of his theory of descriptions.)
Russell, B.A.W. (1921) The Analysis of Mind, London: Allen & Unwin.
(A characteristic expression of Russell’s mature analytic programme in philosophy, especially notable for the priority given to the philosophy of mind over the philosophy of language.)
Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.
(Ryle uses the techniques of linguistic analysis to criticize Descartes’ ‘Myth of the Mind’.)
Stalnaker, R. (1984) Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(Chapters 1 and 2 are an excellent critical discussion of the ‘priority of language’ thesis.)
Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals, London: Methuen.
(An account of universals and particulars by reference to an account of the roles of subject and predicate in language; but other chapters, especially chapter 2 on ‘Sounds’, show Strawson venturing well beyond analytic inquiries.)
Urmson, J.O. (1956) Philosophical Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(A description of the development of twentieth-century philosophical analysis from the perspective of Oxford philosophy of the 1950s.)
Williams, B.A.O. (1995) ‘Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look’, in N.
Bunnin and E.P.
Tsui-James (eds) The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 25–37.
(A sceptical discussion of the limited virtues of the methods of analytical philosophy especially as applied within ethics.)
Wittgenstein, L.J.J. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans.
Ogden and F.P.
Ramsey, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(Wittgenstein’s classic statement of the logical atomist position.)