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Aristotelianism in the 17th century

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-DA081-1
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DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-DA081-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved March 28, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/aristotelianism-in-the-17th-century/v-1

3. Matter and form

There was a debate in school texts about whether matter can exist without form. A positive resolution of this esoteric topic might lead one towards a dualistic, as opposed to a hylomorphic, conception of substance. Toletus (1589 I.13) discussed whether prime matter is a substance and detailed Aquinas’ negative answer. According to Aquinas, prime matter is pure potency or has only potential being, so prime matter cannot be brought into being without form and cannot subsist without form. Toletus also explained Scotus’ affirmative reply, that matter is a positive entity really different from the reality of form and can subsist in its own right distinct from form. Toletus shared Aquinas’ view, his own doctrine being that prime matter is imperfect in itself (Toletus 1589 I.13: fol. 34 verso ). Bouju also followed the Thomist line (Bouju 1614 I: 315–31). In contrast, Eustachius supported a variant of Scotus’ doctrine: ‘Though matter cannot be produced nor annihilated by any natural agent, God can create or annihilate it… God can strip naked all forms, substantial and accidental, from matter, or create it naked, without form, ex nihilo, and allow it to subsist by its own power in such a state’ (1609 III.1.2.4: 16–17). Abra de Raconis agreed; quoting both Aquinas and Scotus, he said that matter is an incomplete substance, but maintained that God can create matter without substantial form ([1617] 1651 Tractatus de Principiis 4: 35–9). Scipion Dupleix threw into relief the disagreement between Thomists and Scotists:

Thus matter deserves the name of substance because it subsists by itself and is not in any subject. This reply is based on the Philosopher’s doctrine, but it does not satisfy everyone, particularly Saint Thomas Aquinas and his followers, who hold that such matter is not in nature, and cannot be in it, and even that this is so repugnant to nature that God himself cannot make it subsist thus stripped of all form. But this opinion is too bold, too mistaken, and it has been rejected by Scotus the Subtle [Doctor] and by several others.

(Dupleix [1603] 1990: 131)

It is interesting to note that Dupleix argued against Aquinas’ doctrine of prime matter by analogy to the sacrament of the Eucharist requiring real qualities and substantial forms, a difficulty that would haunt Cartesians and atomists later in the century. Some textbook writers got around the accusation by accepting the reality of matter as a miracle – for example, de Ceriziers argued that there can be no form without matter and no matter without form naturally, but added ‘however, one must not deny that God can conserve matter without any form, since these are two beings that can be distinguished, that no more depend upon one another than accident from substance, the former being separated from the latter in the Eucharist’ (1643 III: 51–2). The solution seems to have been unstable, so that by 1665 (II: 27) Gaultruche argued against the Thomists (contra Thomistas) about prime matter.

Not everyone gave up the Thomist doctrine of matter. Although Scotists such as Frassen seem to have had the best of the argument, and Thomists and Jesuits such as Barbay and Vincent needed to opt for middle ground, some Thomists resolutely maintained their position (Frassen 1686: 36–41; Barbay 1676b: 64–72; Vincent 1660: 2.74–7). For example, the Dominican Antoine Goudin wrote:

it can be asked whether God by means of his omnipotence could create matter without it having a form. Scotus asserts it, as do some authors outside of Saint Thomas’ school; Saint Thomas and all the Thomists deny it…. It seems that matter cannot exist without form even by means of God’s absolute power. That is what Saint Thomas states (III quodlib. art 1). God himself cannot make it that something exist and not exist. He cannot make something that implies a contradiction and, consequently, he cannot make matter be without form.

(Goudin [1668] 1864 II: 131)

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Citing this article:
Ariew, Roger. Matter and form. Aristotelianism in the 17th century, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-DA081-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/aristotelianism-in-the-17th-century/v-1/sections/matter-and-form-1.
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