Art, definition of

2. Early definitions of art

Many of the famous theories of art offered in the past – Plato’s conception of art as mimesis (imitation or representation), Tolstoy’s view of art as the communication of feeling, Clive Bell’s account of art as significant form – fail very obviously when treated as real definitions. If the key notions are construed so broadly that all art works cannot help falling under them, these notions are also bound to cover many things that are not art works. If the central terms are read narrowly, then, they still seem certain to apply to some things that are not art, as well as not applying to some pieces that generally are agreed to be art. It is best to treat these views as recommending fruitful approaches to art’s interpretation, or indicating art’s more salient or valuable features, rather than as real definitions. Indeed, this is the spirit in which most were offered. These theories are addressed to an audience already skilled in the identification of art, and take that common understanding for granted.

Is a more rigorous approach to a definition of art possible? Morris Weitz (1956) has famously and influentially argued that art has no fixed essence and, hence, that no real definition of art can be successful. He notes that when we look, we find no property common to all works of art. Art-making is creative and, hence, inevitably defeats the definer’s attempt to congeal what is a fluid process. Weitz explains the unity of the concept of art with the idea of a network of ‘family resemblances’, a notion he adopts from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (see Wittgenstein, L. §§10–12). Works of art are appropriately grouped together in terms of similarities that link them, though there is no single feature or set of qualities shared by all.

Weitz’s positive view faces serious difficulties. Similarity could not provide a basis for recognizing the first works of art, since these had no artistic forebears that they might resemble. Nor does the appeal to similarity explain the status of more recent art works. Some art works, such as ready-mades or representational works, more closely resemble things that are not art than they resemble art works; for instance, art films are more like TV ‘soaps’ and home videos than sculptures. A counter to this objection might insist that only relevant numbers, kinds, or degrees of similarity are significant in establishing the classification of things as art. To enumerate and clarify the types of resemblance that count towards something’s being a work of art is to return to art’s definition, however, for one would have to specify the set of similarities that are necessary and sufficient for something to count as art. Weitz’s reliance on the notion of resemblance does not replace the need for definitions of the type he declared to be impossible.

On the face of it there is no significant property perceptible in all art works. If so, this counts against the kinds of theories Weitz was keen to attack, namely, those proposing that art might be defined in terms of shared aesthetic properties, these being conceived as qualities revealed directly to the senses. But it is not clear that Weitz has demonstrated the impossibility of defining art, for the relevant properties might be imperceptible. (One cannot distinguish uncles from other males merely by examining their appearances, but this does not show that the idea of an uncle is indefinable.) It is plausible to expect that some complex, imperceptible relation between creators, the things they make and the audience that receives them will lie behind a definition of art. Hence, even if Weitz is correct in claiming that we do not see a property common to all art works, this does not show art to be indefinable.

What of Weitz’s further claim – that a real definition of art will be refuted and repudiated by artists’ creativity? Again, the claim appears plausible only when directed against definitions holding that art works must possess aesthetic qualities (given a limited set of these). A definition relating artists, their products and audiences might easily accommodate innovative kinds of art, because it emphasizes the context of creation and reception rather than the constitution of the piece involved in this transaction.

As we have seen, those who argue that art cannot be defined face the task of explaining the robust integrity of the concept. Weitz’s appeal to similarity might not to be up the task, but the so-called “cluster” theory provides a plausible alternative. The most recently defended version of the theory is presented by Berys Gaut (2000). He identifies ten criteria for arthood: (1) possesses positive aesthetic properties; (2) is expressive of emotion; (3) is intellectually challenging; (4) is formally complex and coherent; (5) is capable of conveying complex meanings; (6) exhibits an individual point of view; (7) is an exercise of creative imagination; (8) is an artefact or performance that is the product of high skill; (9) belongs to an established art form; (10) is the product of an intention to make a work of art. None of these criteria is individually necessary for something’s being art, but various subsets of these properties can be sufficient for something’s being art. For example, one item might be art because it satisfies the first eight criteria whereas another might be art because it satisfies the final five criteria.

The cluster theory is presented as antidefinitional in spirit: denying that any of the criteria for art status are necessary for that status rules out the possibility of a simple definition that identifies some number of necessary conditions as jointly sufficient for art. Or in other words, because the theory claims there is more than one way of qualifying as art, no definition identifying a single route to success can be satisfactory. But an appropriate response to this point, if it is convincing, is to concede that the definition must be appropriately complex, rather than to accept that the definitional project must fail. The fact that there is more than one way to become a family member – marriage, birth, adoption, and so on – does not prevent us from defining family membership. Similarly, that there is not a single path to art status, need not prevent us defining art disjunctively, that is, by listing the various sets of qualities such that anything satisfying any one of the sets on the list would be art. Indeed, the nonarbitrariness and overall unity of the qualities identified by Gaut as relevant to art status imply the likely success of a definition of art along the lines suggested.

Nevertheless, it might be said that it is not so much for us to discover whether things are works of art as a result of applying to them an independent standard of resemblance or clustering captured in a definition but, rather, to decide whether they are art. Some such nominalist view is defended by Kathleen Stock (2003), who holds that what makes something art is its being called such by art experts, who make their decisions without being bound by guidelines or principles. We may agree that, as an aspect of culture, the nature of art is socially constructed and historically malleable, depending on human interests and judgments, but even if it is for us to decide whether something is art, it does not follow that that decision can be as arbitrary as the nominalist maintains, for there must be a difference between our coining an additional meaning for an old term and our resolving that some controversial case is to be properly grouped with undisputed paradigms under the same conceptual umbrella. In other words, we should expect the reasons for the attempt to dub something as art to be relevant to the success or otherwise of that attempt.

It seems that the arguments against the possibility of defining art are not conclusive. Moreover, it would be useful to have a definition, since the claim to art-status of many pieces created in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is hotly debated. Some artists have deliberately produced works that challenge the border between art and nonart, provoking the question ‘But is it art?’ If we could define art we would have a means of resolving disputes about ‘hard cases’ of this sort. And even if the attempt to formulate a correct definition is likely to remain controversial, we might come to a deeper understanding of art and its context through the pursuit of such a definition. While antidefinitional arguments have been influential and the impossibility of defining art is still asserted, the number of publications presenting new definitions indicates that reports of the death of the enterprise have been greatly exaggerated.