Artistic interpretation

4. Incompatible interpretations

If acceptable interpretations guide perceptions or experiences of works towards enhanced appreciation of their values, and if art works have potential values that cannot be realized simultaneously in experiences of them, then incompatible interpretations might be equally acceptable. The second antecedent is true of many works and their parts. Iago’s ‘Credo’ aria in Verdi’s Otello, for example, can be interpreted as boisterously defiant or as broodingly sinister, and these different readings of the score and text will lead to different understandings of the character and his relations to other characters and to the dramatic events, and to different experiences of the work’s expressive qualities. We cannot simply combine these interpretations by viewing the aria as ambiguous, since a reading or performance of it as ambiguous would differ from both these interpretations. It would be probably less satisfying, if more subtle, than either of the single interpretations, each of which could be equally satisfying or acceptable.

Interpretations are incompatible when they ascribe properties to a work (or its parts) that it cannot simultaneously possess. They are acceptable when they produce understanding and experience of works that enhances the appreciation of central values in those works. Since great works of art are often multi-dimensional, it is rare that all their artistic values can be appreciated under single interpretations. When there are at least two incompatible but equally acceptable interpretations of a work, we cannot simply equate acceptability with truth. Inconsistent ascriptions cannot all be true, at least not absolutely. Talk of plausibility will not do here either, since plausibility must be defined in terms of probable truth. In such cases we can speak only of either acceptability or of truth relative to an acceptable interpretive scheme. When there is only one acceptable interpretation of some part of a work, we can continue to speak simply of truth.

That many works of art are intended to be susceptible to a variety of interpretations is indicated by their frequent use of metaphor and symbol, and by the incompleteness of their notations (especially in music). A theory of interpretation must explain why many apparent critical disagreements seem irresolvable. The theory presented above explains such disagreements as symptoms of incompatible but equally acceptable interpretations, and it explains the latter as resulting ultimately from differences in taste. If different interpretations enhance different artistic values by explaining elements within works as serving those values, then preference for one interpretation of a work over another will reflect a preference for particular kinds of experience that can be derived from the work. That is, it will reflect a particular taste in art.

Thus, interpretive disputes will mirror disagreements in evaluations of various works. Only realists or absolutists about the latter should be realists or absolutists about the former. Nevertheless, the acceptance of incompatible interpretations of the same works does not imply a lack of standards. Iago’s aria may be interpreted in either of the irreconcilable ways mentioned above, but a reading or performance of it as light-heartedly humorous would be clearly inappropriate. An acceptable interpretation must adequately explain the work of art as it can be non-interpretively described.