Causation, further themes

References and further readings

	Bennett, J. (1988) Events and Their Names, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. (An assessment of rival views of events and facts as causal relata.)
	Collins, J., Hall, N., Paul, L. A. (2004) Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (A collection of original essays exploring the connections between counterfactuals and causation.)
	Collins, J., Hall, N., Paul, L. A. (1967) ‘Causal Relations’, Journal of Philosophy 64: 691–703; reprinted in Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. (An influential discussion of the nature of causal relata and the relation between causation and laws.)
	Davidson, D. (1970) ‘Mental Events’, in L. Foster and J. Swanson (eds) Experience and Theory, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press: 207–25: reprinted in Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. (Applies the above view of causal relata and causation to the problem of mental causation.)
	Davidson, D. (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Several relevant papers, conveniently collected.)
	Dowe, P. (2000) Physical Causation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Advocates an empirical analysis of causation in terms of quantity-conserving processes.)
	Ehring, D. (1997) Causation and Persistence, New York: Oxford University Press. (Advocates a theory of causal relata as tropes or property instances.)
	Eells, E. (1991) Probabilistic Causality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Presents separate probabilistic analysis of type and token causation.)
	Fair, D. (1979) ‘Causation and the Flow of Energy’, Erkenntnis 14: 219–250. (An early empirical analysis of causation in terms of the conservation laws of physics.)
	Kim, J. (1980) ‘Events as Property Exemplifications’ in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds) Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1598–1577. (Advocates a theory of events as instantiations of properties by objects at times.)
	Hitchcock, C. (1995) ‘Mishap at Reichenbach Fall: Singular vs General Causation’, Philosophical Studies 78: 257–291. (Explores the relativity of causal statements to contrast cases.)
	Hitchcock, C. (1996) ‘The Role of Contrast in Causal and Explanatory Claims’, Synthese 107: 395–419. (Explores the relativity of causal statements to contrast cases.)
	Lewis, D. (1973) ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 556–567; reprinted in Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers, vol. II, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. (The first statement of Lewis’s counterfactual theory of causation.)
	Lewis, D. (1986) Philosophical Papers, vol. II, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Reprints early articles by Lewis on causation and counterfactuals and contains valuable postscripts to these articles.)
	Lewis, D. (2000) ‘Causation as Influence’, Journal of Philosophy 97: 182–197; expanded version in Collins, J., Hall, N., Paul, L. A. (eds) Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. (Lewis’s last formulation of his counterfactual theory.)
	Lewis, D. (2004) ‘Void and Object’ in Collins, J., Hall, N., Paul, L. A. (eds) Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004, 277–290. (Criticizes the functionalist theory of causation on the grounds of its inadequacy in handling causal statements involving absences and omissions.)
	Mellor, D. H. (1995) The Facts of Causation, London: Routledge. (Argues for facts as causes and effects but denies that causation is a relation between facts.)
	Menzies, P. (1996) ‘Probabilistic Causation and the Pre-emption Problem’, Mind 105: 85–117. (Advocates a functionalist theory of causation.)
	Pearl, J. (2000) Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (An influential treatment of causation in terms of quantitative modelling techniques.)
	Salmon, W. (1984) Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Argues for process theory of causation.)
	Woodward, J. (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Advocates a manipulability theory of causation and causal explanation.)