Content, non-conceptual

References and further reading

	Crane, T. (1992) ‘The Nonconceptual Content of Experience’, in T. Crane (ed.) The Contents of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Defines non-conceptual content and argues that perceptual experience has non-conceptual content, on the basis of a contrast between the different inferential roles of perception and belief. Sections 1–3 provide a straightforward introduction to the topic of non-conceptual content as understood in §1 above.)
	Cussins, A. (1990) ‘The Connectionist Construction of Concepts’, in M. Boden (ed.) The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (An attempt to show how states with conceptual content emerge out of states with non-conceptual content.)
	Dretske, F.I. (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Oxford: Blackwell. (A physicalist theory of intentional content, based on the mathematical concept of information. Though it presents an original theory, this is a very clearly written book.)
	Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Influential and wide-ranging account of reference and thought. At various points in the book the claim that experiences have non-conceptual content is defended. Difficult in parts.)
	Marr, D. (1982) Vision, San Francisco, CA: Freeman. (Pioneering and influential computational theory of vision. After the introduction, some knowledge of mathematics is needed.)
	Martin, M.G.F. (1992) ‘Perception, Concepts and Memory’, Philosophical Review 101: 745–63. (Argues that perceptual experiences have non-conceptual contents, based on an examination of the relation between memory and perception.)
	Mc Dowell, J. (1994) Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Chapter 3 argues that experience is fully conceptual. A difficult work, though not technical.)
	Peacocke, C. (1993) A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Lucid though difficult, chapter 3 defends an account of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience.)
	Sellars, W. (1956) ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Classic statement of Sellars’ argument against the ‘myth of the given’. Difficult.)