Bach, K. (1987) Thought and Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Chapter 13 challenges Putnam’s and Burge’s twin earth thought experiments.)
Block, N. (1986) ‘Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology’, in P.
et al. (eds) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 10, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Surveys a wide variety of theories and defends a conceptual role theory of narrow content.)
Burge, T. (1979) ‘Individualism and the Mental’, in P.
et al. (eds) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Employs a variety of twin earth thought experiments to argue that mental contents are to a degree socially constituted.)
Crane, T. (1991) ‘All the Difference in the World’, Philosophical Quarterly
(Challenges Putnam’s and Burge’s twin earth thought experiments.)
Fodor, J. (1987) Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(Explores White’s idea that narrow content is a function from context to wide content.)
Fodor, J. (1994) The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(Argues that wide content is the only notion of content needed for the purposes of psychological explanation.)
Loar, B. (1988) ‘Social Content and Psychological Content’ and ‘Reply to Bilgrami’, in R.
Grimm and P.
Merrill (eds) Contents of Thoughts, Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
(Argues, contrary to Burge, that psychological content is not in general what is captured by oblique ‘that’-clauses.)
Loewer, B. and Rey, G. (1991) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell.
(Articles, with replies by Fodor, addressing main issues in the theory of content.)
Patterson, S. (1990) ‘The Explanatory Role of Belief Ascriptions’, Philosophical Studies
(Argues that the orthodox interpretation of Burge’s twin earth thought experiments does not do justice to the ways in which intentional states are individuated in common-sense psychology.)
Putnam, H. (1975) ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in K.
Gunderson (ed.) Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Devises twin earth thought experiments to argue that meanings cannot both determine reference and be ‘in the head’.)
Stich, S. and Warfield, T. (1994) Mental Representation: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell.
(Includes important articles on major theories of content.)
Unger, P. (1984) Philosophical Relativity, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Chapter 5 challenges the twin earth thought experiments by showing how varying their details yields conflicting intuitions.)
Wallace, J. and Mason, H.E. (1990) ‘Some Thought Experiments about Mind and Meaning’, in C.A.
Anderson and J.
Owens (eds) Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
(Argues that ordinary language provides much richer and subtler ways of attributing mental contents than is allowed by the orthodox interpretation of Burge’s twin earth thought experiments.)
White, S. (1982) ‘Partial Character and the Language of Thought’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
(Proposes a conception of narrow content as a function from context to wide content.)