Content: wide and narrow

Bibliography and further reading

	Blackburn, S. (1984) Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (An introduction to the philosophy of language, including a defense of narrow content.)
	Block, Ned (1986) “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10(1): 615–678. (An explanation and defense of conceptual role semantics.)
	Burge, T. (1979) ‘Individualism and the Mental,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4(1): 73–121. (A classic defense of social externalism, the view that the contents of some concepts are partly determined by social factors.)
	Burge, T. (1986) “Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind,” Journal of Philosophy 83(12): 697–720. (Develops further arguments for social externalism.)
	Chalmers, D. (2002) “The Components of Content,” in D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press., 608–633. (An articulation of narrow content as scenario content.)
	Chomsky, N. (1995) “Language and Nature,” Mind 104(413): 1–61. (Articulates a naturalistic approach to language and mental representation and rejects the idea that reference to real-world objects is a real-world phenomenon.)
	Clark, A., and Chalmers, D. (1998) “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58(1): 10–23. (Defense of extended cognition.)
	Davidson, D. (1987) “Knowing One’s Own Mind,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60(3): 441–458. (Defence of a radical externalist position.)
	Dretske, F. (1988) Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Offers a naturalist theory of wide content.)
	Fodor, J. (1987) Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Argues that computational, scientific psychology largely vindicates common sense psychology, but individuates psychological states by narrow contents.)
	Fodor, J. (1990) A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge: MIT Press. (A collection of essays, some of which develop a causal theory of wide content.)
	Frege, G. (1980 [1892]) “On Sense and Reference,” in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black (eds and trans), Oxford: Blackwell, 56–78. (A seminal article, originally published in 1892, that laid the foundations for much subsequent study of language and mental representation.)
	Hutchins, Edwin (1995). Cognition in the Wild, Cambridge: MIT Press
	Kaplan, D. (1989) “Demonstratives,” in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press., 481–563. (A seminal article showing how demonstratives can be treated in formal semantic theory.)
	Larson, R., and Segal, G. (1995) Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press. (A general introduction to formal semantic theory, with Chapter 13 defending internalism with respect to the psychological states involved in understanding language.)
	Loar, B. (1988) “Social Content and Psychological Content,” in R. Grimm and D. Merrill (eds) Contents of Thought, Tucson: University of Arizona Press., 99–110. (An influential article offering thought experiments that motivate internalism.)
	Millikan, R. (1989) “Biosemantics,” Journal of Philosophy 86(6): 281–297. (An influential article offering an account of wide content in terms of evolutionary function.)
	McDowell, J. (1984) “De re senses,” Philosophical Quarterly 34(136): 283–294. (Argues that some Fregean senses are wide.)
	Papineau, D. (1993) Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford: Blackwell. (Offers an account of wide content in terms of evolutionary function.)
	Putnam, H. (1975) “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in K. Gunderson (ed.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (A seminal article developing the idea of Twin Earth and arguing that the meaning of natural-kind terms is wide.)
	Segal, G. (1989) “Return of the Individual,” Mind 98(389): 35–57. (Defends the proposition that singular concepts have narrow contents.)
	Segal, G. (2000) A Slim Book about Narrow Content, Cambridge: MIT Press. (A general introduction to debates concerning wide and narrow content, offering an extended defense of internalism with respect to non-singular concepts.)
	Segal, G. (2005) “Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns,” in Richard Schantz (ed.) The Externalist Challenge, Berlin: De Gruyter., 329–346. (Argues that referential wide content for singular concepts has an explanatory role in psychology, but that externalist intuitions about natural-kind concepts are not natural for humans.)
	Segal, G. (2007) “Cognitive Contents and Propositional Attitudes,” in J. Cohen and B. McLaughlin (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell., 5–20. (Provides an internalist response to Burge 1986.)
	Segal, G. (2009) “Keep Making Sense,” Synthese 170(2): 275–287. (A defense of sense critiquing Jerry Fodor’s externalism.)
	Stampe, D. (1977) “Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2(1): 42–63. (Develops a causal theory of content.)