Access to the full content is only available to members of institutions that have purchased access. If you belong to such an institution, please log in or find out more about how to order.


Print

Contents

Criteria

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-P010-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P010-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved November 20, 2017, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/criteria/v-1

Article Summary

The concept of criteria has been interpreted as the central notion in the later Wittgenstein’s account of how language functions, in contrast to the realist semantics of the Tractatus. According to this later account, a concept possesses a sense in so far as there are conditions that constitute non-inductive evidence for its application in a particular case. This condition on a concept’s possessing a sense has been thought to enable Wittgenstein to refute both solipsism and scepticism about other minds. There are powerful objections to this conception of criteria, which have led some philosophers to look for an alternative account of the role of criteria in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

Print
Citing this article:
McGinn, Marie. Criteria, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P010-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/criteria/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2017 Routledge.

Related Searches

Topics

Related Articles