Deductive closure principle

References and further reading

	Brueckner, A. (1985) ‘Skepticism and Epistemic Closure’, Philosophical Topics 13 (3): 89–117. (Critical overview of the issues discussed in this entry.)
	Dretske, F.I. (1970) ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy 67 (24): 1007–23. (Locus classicus of the relevant alternatives theory discussed in §2 above, and includes the zebra case discussed in that section; contains a sketch of a view like Nozick‘s, considered above in §3.)
	Dretske, F.I. (1981) ‘The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge’, Philosophical Studies 40 (3): 363–378. (Useful discussion of the concept of a relevant alternative.)
	Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23 (6): 121–123. (The origin of the Gettier problem discussed above in §1.)
	Goldman, A.I. (1976) ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy 73 (20): 771–791. (Reliability as discrimination, as discussed in §3 above; contains a useful discussion of the concept of a relevant alternative.)
	Klein, P. (1981) Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Discussion of the argument for the closure of justification discussed in §2 above; discussion of the relation between closure principles and the problem of scepticism.)
	Klein, P. (1987) ‘On Behalf of the Skeptic’, in S. Luper-Foy (ed.) The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and his Critics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. (Contains an argument that reliabilism can provide support for Closure, as discussed above in §3; the book contains many trenchant critical articles about the anti-sceptical strategy of Nozick, as well as a helpful bibliography.)
	Kyburg, H.E. (1970) Probability and Inductive Logic, Toronto, Ont.: Macmillan. (Chapter 13 gives a presentation of the lottery paradox discussed in §1 above.)
	Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the anti-sceptical strategy discussed in §3 above.)
	Williams, M. (1991) Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, Oxford: Blackwell. (Chapter 8 contains arguments that reliabilism does not induce the failure of Closure, as discussed above in §3.)