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Epistemic contrastivism

DOI
10.4324/0123456789-P071-1
Published
2017
DOI: 10.4324/0123456789-P071-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2017
Retrieved December 10, 2018, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemic-contrastivism/v-1

Article Summary

Contrastivism about knowledge is the view that one does not just know some proposition. It is more adequate to say that one knows something rather than something else: I know that I am looking at a tree rather than a bush but I do not know that I am looking at a tree rather than a cleverly done tree imitation. Knowledge is a three-place relation between a subject, a proposition and a contrast set of propositions. There are several advantages of a contrastivist view but also certain problems with it.

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Citing this article:
Baumann, Peter. Epistemic contrastivism, 2017, doi:10.4324/0123456789-P071-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemic-contrastivism/v-1.
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