Experimental philosophy

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P063-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2011
Retrieved May 18, 2024, from

References and further reading

  • Adams, F. and Steadman, A. (2004)‘Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?’, Analysis 64: 173–181.

    (Argues for a pragmatic interpretation of people’s responses on whether an outcome was intentional.)

  • Cummins, R. (1998)‘Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium’, in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds) Rethinking Intuition, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 113–128.

    (Argues against the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy.)

  • Dennett, D. C. (2007) Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, London: Penguin.

    (Discusses religion in light of empirical work on religious belief.)

  • Deutsch, M. (2009)‘Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference’, Mind & Language 24: 445–466.

    (Critically discusses work purporting to show cross-cultural diversity of referential intuitions.)

  • Feltz, A. and Cokely, E. T. (2009)‘Do Judgments about Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are?’, Consciousness and Cognition 18: 342–350.

    (Discusses results indicating that philosophical intuitions vary by personality type.)

  • Freud, S. (1927) Die Zukunft einer Illusion, Leipzig: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; trans. J. Strachey, The Future of an Illusion, New York: Norton & Co., 1961.

    (Freud argues that the psychological basis for religious belief reveals it to be unwarranted.)

  • Glasgow, J. (2008)‘On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse’.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 333–358.

    (Suggests that conceptual analysis in the contemporary debate over race ought to be focused upon the experimental philosophical investigation of the ordinary or folk concept of race.)

  • Greene, J. (2008)‘The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral Psychology, vol. 3, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Uses psychological research on moral intuitions to argue that Kantian moral views are rationally suspect.)

  • Hauser, M. F., Cushman, Young, L., Kang-Xing Jin, R. and Mikhail, J. (2007)‘A Dissociation between Moral Judgments and Justifications’, Mind & Language 22: 1–21.

    (Explores the extent to which moral judgement results from conscious moral reasoning using data from a vast,Internet-based survey known as the ‘Moral Sense Test’.)

  • Jackson, F. (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (A defence and explication of conceptual analysis as the central method of philosophy.)

  • Kauppinen, A. (2007)‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, Philosophical Explorations 10: 95–118.

    (A critique of the possibility of survey-based experimental philosophy.)

  • Knobe, J. (2003)‘Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language’, Analysis 63: 190–193.

    (Cited in the introductory section above; classic finding that people give different responses to whether some outcome was intentional depending on whether the outcome was good or bad.)

  • Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (2008) Experimental Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.

    (Collection of central papers in experimental philosophy.)

  • Ludwig, K. (2007)‘The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First versus Third Person Approaches’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 128–159.

    (Defends a priori philosophical method from experimental philosophy by criticizing central experimental philosophical findings.)

  • Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2004)‘Semantics, Cross-cultural Style’, Cognition 92: B1–B12.

    (Presents evidence for cultural differences in intuitions about reference.)

  • Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2009)‘Against Arguments from Reference’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356.

    (Explores some general philosophical implications of diversity in intuitions about reference.)

  • Nadelhoffer, T. (2006)‘Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality’, Philosophical Explorations 9: 203–219.

    (Explains people’s judgements about whether an outcome was intentional by suggesting that emotions inappropriately bias responses.)

  • Nahmias, E., Morris, S. G., Nadelhoffer, T. and Turner, J. (2006)‘Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 28–53.

    (Argues that experimental results indicate that incompatibilism is not intuitive.)

  • Nichols, S. and Knobe, J. (2007)‘Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions’.Noûs 41: 663–685.

    (Argues that responses to questions about responsibility and determinism are affected by emotion.)

  • Nichols, S. and Ulatowski, J. (2007)‘Intuitions and Individual Differences’, Mind & Language 22: 346–365.

    (Presents evidence that even within a culture, people show systematic differences in intuitions about some cases.)

  • Petrinovich, L. and O’Neill, P. (1996)‘Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral Intuitions’, Ethology and Sociobiology 17: 145–171.

    (Provides evidence that moral intuitions are affected by the order of presentation.)

  • Singer, P. (2005)‘Ethics and Intuitions’, Journal of Ethics 9: 331–352.

    (Draws on empirical research on moral intuitions to argue that we should ignore antiutilitarian intuitions.)

  • Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008)‘Framing Moral Intuitions’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral Psychology, vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 47–76.

    (This paper uses empirical results on intuitions to raise problems for certain intuition-based moral theories.)

  • Sosa, E. (2007)‘Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition’, Philosophical Studies 132: 99–107.

    (Sosa defends the use of intuitions against challenges from experimental philosophy.)

  • Swain, S., Alexander, J. and Weinberg, J. M. (2008)‘The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 138–155.

    (Reports results showing that people make different judgments about some epistemic thought experiments based on the order of presentation.)

  • Thomson, J. (1976)‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’, Monist 59: 204–217.

    (The ‘trolley problem’ is introduced and used as evidence for claims about what is morally permissible.)

  • Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2001)‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’, Philosophical Topics 29: 429–460.

    (This paper presents results indicating cultural diversity in epistemic intuitions and explores the implications for epistemology.)

Citing this article:
Mallon, Ron and Shaun Nichols. Bibliography. Experimental philosophy, 2011, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P063-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
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