Experimental philosophy

References and further reading

	Adams, F. and Steadman, A. (2004)‘Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?’, Analysis 64: 173–181. (Argues for a pragmatic interpretation of people’s responses on whether an outcome was intentional.)
	Cummins, R. (1998)‘Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium’, in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds) Rethinking Intuition, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 113–128. (Argues against the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy.)
	Dennett, D. C. (2007) Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, London: Penguin. (Discusses religion in light of empirical work on religious belief.)
	Deutsch, M. (2009)‘Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference’, Mind & Language 24: 445–466. (Critically discusses work purporting to show cross-cultural diversity of referential intuitions.)
	Feltz, A. and Cokely, E. T. (2009)‘Do Judgments about Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are?’, Consciousness and Cognition 18: 342–350. (Discusses results indicating that philosophical intuitions vary by personality type.)
	Freud, S. (1927) Die Zukunft einer Illusion, Leipzig: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; trans. J. Strachey, The Future of an Illusion, New York: Norton & Co., 1961. (Freud argues that the psychological basis for religious belief reveals it to be unwarranted.)
	Glasgow, J. (2008)‘On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse’.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 333–358. (Suggests that conceptual analysis in the contemporary debate over race ought to be focused upon the experimental philosophical investigation of the ordinary or folk concept of race.)
	Greene, J. (2008)‘The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral Psychology, vol. 3, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Uses psychological research on moral intuitions to argue that Kantian moral views are rationally suspect.)
	Hauser, M. F., Cushman, Young, L., Kang-Xing Jin, R. and Mikhail, J. (2007)‘A Dissociation between Moral Judgments and Justifications’, Mind & Language 22: 1–21. (Explores the extent to which moral judgement results from conscious moral reasoning using data from a vast,Internet-based survey known as the ‘Moral Sense Test’.)
	Jackson, F. (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A defence and explication of conceptual analysis as the central method of philosophy.)
	Kauppinen, A. (2007)‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, Philosophical Explorations 10: 95–118. (A critique of the possibility of survey-based experimental philosophy.)
	Knobe, J. (2003)‘Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language’, Analysis 63: 190–193. (Cited in the introductory section above; classic finding that people give different responses to whether some outcome was intentional depending on whether the outcome was good or bad.)
	Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (2008) Experimental Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Collection of central papers in experimental philosophy.)
	Ludwig, K. (2007)‘The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First versus Third Person Approaches’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 128–159. (Defends a priori philosophical method from experimental philosophy by criticizing central experimental philosophical findings.)
	Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2004)‘Semantics, Cross-cultural Style’, Cognition 92: B1–B12. (Presents evidence for cultural differences in intuitions about reference.)
	Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2009)‘Against Arguments from Reference’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356. (Explores some general philosophical implications of diversity in intuitions about reference.)
	Nadelhoffer, T. (2006)‘Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality’, Philosophical Explorations 9: 203–219. (Explains people’s judgements about whether an outcome was intentional by suggesting that emotions inappropriately bias responses.)
	Nahmias, E., Morris, S. G., Nadelhoffer, T. and Turner, J. (2006)‘Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 28–53. (Argues that experimental results indicate that incompatibilism is not intuitive.)
	Nichols, S. and Knobe, J. (2007)‘Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions’.Noûs 41: 663–685. (Argues that responses to questions about responsibility and determinism are affected by emotion.)
	Nichols, S. and Ulatowski, J. (2007)‘Intuitions and Individual Differences’, Mind & Language 22: 346–365. (Presents evidence that even within a culture, people show systematic differences in intuitions about some cases.)
	Petrinovich, L. and O’Neill, P. (1996)‘Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral Intuitions’, Ethology and Sociobiology 17: 145–171. (Provides evidence that moral intuitions are affected by the order of presentation.)
	Singer, P. (2005)‘Ethics and Intuitions’, Journal of Ethics 9: 331–352. (Draws on empirical research on moral intuitions to argue that we should ignore antiutilitarian intuitions.)
	Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008)‘Framing Moral Intuitions’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral Psychology, vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 47–76. (This paper uses empirical results on intuitions to raise problems for certain intuition-based moral theories.)
	Sosa, E. (2007)‘Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition’, Philosophical Studies 132: 99–107. (Sosa defends the use of intuitions against challenges from experimental philosophy.)
	Swain, S., Alexander, J. and Weinberg, J. M. (2008)‘The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 138–155. (Reports results showing that people make different judgments about some epistemic thought experiments based on the order of presentation.)
	Thomson, J. (1976)‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’, Monist 59: 204–217. (The ‘trolley problem’ is introduced and used as evidence for claims about what is morally permissible.)
	Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2001)‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’, Philosophical Topics 29: 429–460. (This paper presents results indicating cultural diversity in epistemic intuitions and explores the implications for epistemology.)