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Fact/value distinction

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L130-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved May 21, 2024, from

Article Summary

According to proponents of the fact/value distinction, no states of affairs in the world can be said to be values, and evaluative judgments are best understood not to be pure statements of fact. The distinction was important in twentieth-century ethics, and debate continues about the metaphysical status of value, the epistemology of value, and the best characterization of value-judgments.

Citing this article:
Crisp, Roger. Fact/value distinction, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L130-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2024 Routledge.

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