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Crittenden, C. (1991) Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects, Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.
(Mentioned in §3. Good general introduction to the subject, with a point of view sympathetic to that of Meinong.) |
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Currie, G. (1990) The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Presents a detailed logical theory of all aspects of fictionality. Quite technical.) |
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Goodman, N. (1968) The Languages of Art, New York: Bobbs-Merrill. (Referred to in §2. A strict eliminative theory of fictional entities applied to all art forms.) |
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Howell, R. (1979) ‘Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren’t’, Poetics 8: 129– 77. (Careful, critical exposition of the main logical approaches.) |
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Inwagen, P. van (1977) ‘Creatures of Fiction’, American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 299– 308. (Referred to in §3. Attributes some reality to fictional entities.) |
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Lamarque, P.V. and Olsen, S.H. (1994) Truth, Fiction and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Useful introduction to logical, epistemological and literary conceptions of fiction, as outlined in §1.) |
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Meinong, A. (1960) ‘Theory of Objects’, in R.M.
Chisholm (ed.) Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
(Referred to in §3. Classic statement of the case for nonexistent objects as well as existent objects.) |
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Ogden, C.K. (1932) Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. (Referred to in §2. Bentham’s theory of fictions and paraphrase was a strong influence on twentieth-century logical analysis.) |
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Parsons, T. (1980) Nonexistent Objects, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
(Referred to in §3. A sophisticated defence and development of Meinong’s theory. Technical in parts.) |
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Quine, W.V. (1953) ‘On What There Is’, in From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Referred to in §2. Classic statement of the logical criterion of ontological commitment.) |
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Rorty, R. (1982) ‘Is There a Problem About Fictional Discourse?’, in Consequences of Pragmatism, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
(Referred to in §3. Dismisses the whole approach of analytic philosophy to fictional entities.) |
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Russell, B. (1956) Logic and Knowledge, ed. R.C.
Marsh, London: Allen & Unwin. (Includes ‘On Denoting’ and ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, where Russell develops and applies his Theory of Descriptions and conception of logical fictions. See §2.) |
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Walton, K.L. (1990) Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Referred to in §2. Presents an eliminative theory of fictional entities, in terms of ‘games of make-believe’.) |
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Wolterstorff, N. (1980) Works and Worlds of Art, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(Referred to in §3. At times difficult; but a powerful case for fictional characters as eternal kinds.) |