Access to the full content is only available to members of institutions that have purchased access. If you belong to such an institution, please log in or find out more about how to order.


Print

Contents

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-W013-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-W013-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved July 19, 2018, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/folk-psychology/v-1

Article Summary

There is wide disagreement about the meaning of ordinary mental terms (such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’). Sellars suggested that our use of these terms is governed by a widely shared theory, ‘folk psychology’, a suggestion that has gained empirical support in psychological studies of self-attribution and in a growing literature concerning how children acquire (or, in the case of autism, fail to acquire) ordinary mental concepts. Recently, there has been a lively debate about whether people actually ‘theorize’ about the mind, or, instead, engage in some kind of ‘simulation’ of mental processes.

Print
Citing this article:
Stich, Stephen P. and Georges Rey. Folk psychology, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-W013-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/folk-psychology/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2018 Routledge.

Related Articles