DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-W013-1
Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved June 10, 2023, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/folk-psychology/v-1
Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved June 10, 2023, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/folk-psychology/v-1
Article Summary
There is wide disagreement about the meaning of ordinary mental terms (such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘pain’). Sellars suggested that our use of these terms is governed by a widely shared theory, ‘folk psychology’, a suggestion that has gained empirical support in psychological studies of self-attribution and in a growing literature concerning how children acquire (or, in the case of autism, fail to acquire) ordinary mental concepts. Recently, there has been a lively debate about whether people actually ‘theorize’ about the mind, or, instead, engage in some kind of ‘simulation’ of mental processes.
Citing this article:
Stich, Stephen P. and Georges Rey. Folk psychology, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-W013-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/folk-psychology/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2023 Routledge.
Stich, Stephen P. and Georges Rey. Folk psychology, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-W013-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/folk-psychology/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2023 Routledge.