|
Adams, M.M. (1991) ‘Forgiveness: A Christian Model’, Faith and Philosophy 8 (3): 277–304. (Criticizes the work of Jeffrie Murphy and others who have argued that forgiveness may be incompatible with self-respect.) |
|
Butler, J. (1722) Sermons, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897. (Sermon VIII, ‘Upon Resentment’, and Sermon IX, ‘Upon Forgiveness of Injuries’, present the essence of Butler’s account of forgiveness.) |
|
Card, C. (1972) ‘On Mercy’, Philosophical Review 81: 182–207. (Argues that mercy is a part of justice (on a sophisticated theory of justice) and not an autonomous moral virtue.) |
|
Hill, T.E., Jr. (1973) ‘Servility and Self-respect’, The Monist 57: 87–104. (Argues, on Kantian grounds of duty to self, that servility is a moral vice.) |
|
Kant, I. (1797) The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M.
Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 140–45, 168–9. (Develops Kant’s theory of justice and employs it to defend retributive punishment and to oppose pardons for those convicted of crime.) |
|
Kolnai, A. (1973–4) ‘Forgiveness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74: 91–106. (Argues that forgiveness can be a virtue only if it does not involve complicity in wrongdoing.) |
|
Moore, K.D. (1989) Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Presents, in a generally Kantian framework, a theory of when legal pardons may be justified.) |
|
Murphy, J.G. (1997) ‘Repentance, Punishment and Mercy’, in A.
Brien (ed.) The Quality of Mercy, Value Inquiry Book Series, Amsterdam: Rodopi; also in A.
Etzioni (ed.) Repentance, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (Presents a detailed analysis of the concept of repentance and argues that repentance can be relevant not simply to mercy and the reduction of punishment, but to the justification of punishment itself.) |
|
Murphy, J.G. and Hampton, J. (1988) Forgiveness and Mercy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Hampton’s two chapters seek to develop, with philosophical rigour, a Christian defence of forgiveness and mercy, while Murphy’s three chapters explore the sceptical case against the claim that forgiveness and mercy are virtues.) |
|
Murphy, J.G. and Morris, H. (1988) ‘Exchange: Forgiveness and Mercy’, Criminal Justice Ethics 7 (2): 3–22. (Murphy summarizes the view of forgiveness and mercy he develops in Forgiveness and Mercy and Morris builds his case against this from remarks on unjustified self-importance made by Simone Weil in her book Gravity and Grace.) |
|
Newman, L.E. (1987) ‘The Quality of Mercy: On the Duty to Forgive in the Judaic Tradition’, Journal of Religious Ethics 15: 155–72. (Stresses the idea that, in the Judaic tradition, forgiveness is more a matter of community reintegration than purity of heart.) |
|
Nietzsche, F. (1887) On The Genealogy of Morals, trans. W.
Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1967. (Explores, among many other things, the destructive role that resentment (ressentiment) plays in the moral life. See, for example, pages 36–9.) |
|
Nussbaum, M. (1993) ‘Equity and Mercy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (2): 83–125. (Builds a case for mercy and empathetic individuation from Seneca’s essays ‘On Anger’ and ‘On Clemency’.) |
|
Quinn, P.L. (1978) Divine Commands and Moral Requirements, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Contains, in the last chapter, a fine discussion of Saint Anselm’s paradoxes of divine mercy.) |
|
Twambley, P. (1976) ‘Mercy and Forgiveness’, Analysis 36: 84–90. (Introduces the distinction between the criminal law and private law models of mercy.) |