Adams, M.M. (1991) ‘Forgiveness: A Christian Model’, Faith and Philosophy 8 (3): 277–304.
(Criticizes the work of Jeffrie Murphy and others who have argued that forgiveness may be incompatible with self-respect.)
Butler, J. (1722) Sermons, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897.
(Sermon VIII, ‘Upon Resentment’, and Sermon IX, ‘Upon Forgiveness of Injuries’, present the essence of Butler’s account of forgiveness.)
Card, C. (1972) ‘On Mercy’, Philosophical Review 81: 182–207.
(Argues that mercy is a part of justice (on a sophisticated theory of justice) and not an autonomous moral virtue.)
Hill, T.E., Jr. (1973) ‘Servility and Self-respect’, The Monist 57: 87–104.
(Argues, on Kantian grounds of duty to self, that servility is a moral vice.)
Kant, I. (1797) The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M.
Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 140–45, 168–9.
(Develops Kant’s theory of justice and employs it to defend retributive punishment and to oppose pardons for those convicted of crime.)
Kolnai, A. (1973–4) ‘Forgiveness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74: 91–106.
(Argues that forgiveness can be a virtue only if it does not involve complicity in wrongdoing.)
Moore, K.D. (1989) Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Presents, in a generally Kantian framework, a theory of when legal pardons may be justified.)
Murphy, J.G. (1997) ‘Repentance, Punishment and Mercy’, in A.
Brien (ed.) The Quality of Mercy, Value Inquiry Book Series, Amsterdam: Rodopi; also in A.
Etzioni (ed.) Repentance, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
(Presents a detailed analysis of the concept of repentance and argues that repentance can be relevant not simply to mercy and the reduction of punishment, but to the justification of punishment itself.)
Murphy, J.G. and Hampton, J. (1988) Forgiveness and Mercy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Hampton’s two chapters seek to develop, with philosophical rigour, a Christian defence of forgiveness and mercy, while Murphy’s three chapters explore the sceptical case against the claim that forgiveness and mercy are virtues.)
Murphy, J.G. and Morris, H. (1988) ‘Exchange: Forgiveness and Mercy’, Criminal Justice Ethics 7 (2): 3–22.
(Murphy summarizes the view of forgiveness and mercy he develops in Forgiveness and Mercy and Morris builds his case against this from remarks on unjustified self-importance made by Simone Weil in her book Gravity and Grace.)
Newman, L.E. (1987) ‘The Quality of Mercy: On the Duty to Forgive in the Judaic Tradition’, Journal of Religious Ethics 15: 155–72.
(Stresses the idea that, in the Judaic tradition, forgiveness is more a matter of community reintegration than purity of heart.)
Nietzsche, F. (1887) On The Genealogy of Morals, trans. W.
Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1967.
(Explores, among many other things, the destructive role that resentment (ressentiment) plays in the moral life. See, for example, pages 36–9.)
Nussbaum, M. (1993) ‘Equity and Mercy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (2): 83–125.
(Builds a case for mercy and empathetic individuation from Seneca’s essays ‘On Anger’ and ‘On Clemency’.)
Quinn, P.L. (1978) Divine Commands and Moral Requirements, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Contains, in the last chapter, a fine discussion of Saint Anselm’s paradoxes of divine mercy.)
Twambley, P. (1976) ‘Mercy and Forgiveness’, Analysis 36: 84–90.
(Introduces the distinction between the criminal law and private law models of mercy.)