Free will

References and further reading

	Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200) On Fate, with translation and commentary by R.W. Sharples, London: Duckworth, 1983. (Incompatibilist defence of free will against the Stoics, by an Aristotelian.)
	Aristotle (c. mid 4th century ) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1953. (Combines compatibilist points with the view that we can be in some sense ultimately responsible for how we are. See book III, chapter V.)
	Augustine (388–395) De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, trans. R.P. Russell, in L. Schopp, R.J. Deferrari (eds) Fathers of the Church, Catholic University of America Press, 1968, vol. 59. (Attempts, hesitantly and controversially, to show that free will is compatible with divine grace.)
	Campbell, C.A. (1967) ‘In Defence of Free Will’, in In Defence of Free Will, London: Allen & Unwin. (Famous statement of the libertarian position that finds scope for exercise of free will especially in situations of moral conflict.)
	Chisholm, R. (1964) ‘Human Freedom and the Self’, in G. Watson (ed.) Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. (Libertarian who argues that free agency involves a distinct kind of causation called ’agent-causation’.)
	Cicero (43–late 50s) On fate, trans. and commentary R.W. Sharples, Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1991 with Latin text. (Critique, by an Academic, of Stoic and Epicurean views on determinism; sole source for the outstanding defence of incompatibilism by Carneades, the second-century bc Academic philosopher.)
	Dennett, D. (1984) Elbow Room, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Vivid defence of compatibilism.)
	Double, R. (1993) The Non-Reality of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Thorough, full-length study whose title is self-explanatory.)
	Fischer, J.M. (1994) The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell. (Tightly argued study of the ramifications of compatibilism.)
	Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, essays 1–5. (Essay 1 is an influential challenge to the view that free will requires the ability to do other than one does. Essays 3 and 5 develop the view referred to in §1 of this entry.)
	Hobart, R.E. (1934) ‘Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without It’, Mind 43. (Influential rehearsal of a Humean compatibilist position.)
	Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Uncompromising ‘necessitarian’ compatibilism.)
	Honderich, T. (1988) The Consequences of Determinism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Determinist who argues against both compatibilism and incompatibilism and considers three responses to determinism: dismay, intransigence and affirmation.)
	Hume, D. (1748) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, §VIII. (Famous statement of the case for compatibilism, following Hobbes and Locke.)
	Kane, R. (1996) The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press. (Contains a careful statement of the ‘free willist’, libertarian case, and a general survey of the debate.)
	Kant, I. (1781) The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1933. (Kant grounds human freedom in a ‘noumenal’ self not subject to the laws of causality, and holds that it requires that one be responsible for one’s character: he believes that we cannot understand how freedom is possible, although we can know that it exists.)
	Kant, I. (1785) Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. M.J. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Kant grounds human freedom in a ‘noumenal’ self not subject to the laws of causality, and holds that it requires that one be responsible for one’s character: he believes that we cannot understand how freedom is possible, although we can know that it exists.)
	Kant, I. (1788) The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L.W. Beck, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956. (Kant grounds human freedom in a ‘noumenal’ self not subject to the laws of causality, and holds that it requires that one be responsible for one’s character: he believes that we cannot understand how freedom is possible, although we can know that it exists.)
	Kant, I. (1793) Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, in Religion and Rational Theology, trans. A.W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Kant grounds human freedom in a ‘noumenal’ self not subject to the laws of causality, and holds that it requires that one be responsible for one’s character: he believes that we cannot understand how freedom is possible, although we can know that it exists.)
	Kant, I. (1993) Opus Postumum, trans. E. Förster and M. Rosen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
	Leibniz, G. (1686) Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. R. Martin, D. Niall and S. Brown, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. (Adapts the astrological tag ‘the stars incline but do not necessitate’ in an account of how free will is compatible with the fact that there is always a reason why we act as we do.)
	Leibniz, G. (1704–5) New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (Adapts the astrological tag ‘the stars incline but do not necessitate’ in an account of how free will is compatible with the fact that there is always a reason why we act as we do; see Book II, Chapter 21.)
	Locke, J. (1690) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. (Brief statement of compatibilist position.)
	Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987), The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 volumes. (The contributions of the incompatibilist Epicureans and Academics and of the – perhaps – compatibilist Stoics are documented in sections 20, 38, 55, 62 and 70.)
	Lucretius (c. 90– c. 50) On the nature of things, trans. W.H.D. Rouse, revised M.F. Smith, Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1975 with Latin text. (II 216–93 is a classic Epicurean incompatibilist argument for physical indeterminism as a necessary condition of free will, and contains the earliest occurrence of the expression ’free will’.)
	Mele, A. (1995) Autonomous Agents, New York: Oxford University Press. (Subtle defence of a form of libertarianism.)
	Nietzsche, F.W. (1886) Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufman, New York: Random House, 1966. (Disbeliever in free will who recommends ‘love of fate’.)
	O’ Connor, T. (1995) Agents, Causes and Events, New York: Oxford University Press. (Useful collection of essays on the prospects for indeterministic accounts of free will.)
	Sartre, J.-P. (1948) Existentialism and Humanism, London: Methuen. (’Existentialist’ defence of human beings’ radical and self-instituted freedom of choice.)
	Spinoza, B. de (1677) Ethics, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, trans. E. Curley, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. (Determinist who argues that to be free is to be conscious of the necessities that compel one.)
	Strawson, G. (1986) Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Puts the case for disbelief in free will and discusses the ’cognitive phenomenology’ of belief in free will.)
	Strawson, P.F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Freedom and Resentment, London: Methuen, 1974. (Develops the view mentioned in §4 of this entry, suggesting that the traditional debate about free will may be rendered unnecessary by proper attention to facts about human psychology.)
	Van Inwagen, P. (1983) An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Contains an exhaustive statement of the objection to compatibilism.)
	Wolf, S. (1990) Freedom Within Reason, New York: Oxford University Press. (Develops the view that the freedom necessary for responsibility involves the ability to act in accordance with one’s values and to form or revise one’s values in accordance with what ’right reason’ recommends.)