Gettier problem

References and further reading

	Barker, J. (1976) ‘What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt You?’, The American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4): 303–308. (Defeasibility approach mentioned in §2 above, which was the first to deal with misleading defeaters, such as t.)
	Chisholm R. (1966) Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 3rd edn, 1989. (The third edition of this textbook refines earlier research by its author and presents a solution mentioned in §4 above concerning falsehoods.)
	Feldman, R. (1974) ‘An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1): 68–69. (Describes an example mentioned above in §1 not involving falsely believing.)
	Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23 (6): 121–123; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 35–38. (Gettier’s presentation of his own two examples.)
	Klein, P. (1971) ‘A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy 68 (16): 471–482. (A defeasibility analysis presenting the Tom Grabit example mentioned above in §2 that has inspired important variants.)
	Klein, P. (1981) Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Defends an improvement upon Klein (1971) mentioned in §2 above; relates defeasibility to issues about certainty and scepticism.)
	Lehrer, K. (1965) ‘Knowledge, Truth, and Evidence’, Analysis 25 (5): 168–175; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 55–66. (A defeasibility analysis presenting the Mr Nogot example mentioned above in §2 that has inspired important variants.)
	Lehrer, K. (1974) Knowledge, London: Oxford University Press. (Presents the clever reasoner example mentioned in §1 above, and analyses knowing so as to accommodate it.)
	Lehrer, K. (1979) ‘The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge’, in G. Pappas (ed.) Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht, Boston, MA, and London: Reidel, 65–78. (Presents the tricky Mr Nogot example mentioned in §3 above.)
	Lehrer, K. (1990) Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO and San Francisco, CA: Westview Press. (A textbook refining earlier research by its author.)
	Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T., Jr. (1969) ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’, The Journal of Philosophy 66 (8): 225–237; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 55–66. (Presents a defeasibility analysis and describes a variant of the Tom Grabit example mentioned above in §2.)
	Moser, P. (1989) Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Presents a defeasibility analysis related to Barker‘s; contains a critique of the solution to the Gettier problem proposed in Shope (1981).)
	Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Contains a section on epistemology analysing knowing in terms of ‘tracking the truth,’ which involves conditionals including the one mentioned in §3 above.)
	Plantinga, A. (1993a) Warrant: the Current Debate, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A thorough survey and critique of contemporary attempts to develop a fourth condition of knowing, which includes counterexamples to Chisholm’s account.)
	Plantinga, A. (1993b) Warrant and Proper Function, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Presents the analysis of knowing discussed in §3 above.)
	Pollock, J.L. (1986) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. (A textbook including one of the most sophisticated defeasibility analyses, discussed above in §2.)
	Pollock, J.L. (1992) ‘Reply to Shope’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2): 411–413. (Explains how his defeasibility theory relates to introspective knowledge; discussed in §2 above.)
	Shope, R.K. (1981) The Analysis of Knowing: a Decade of Research, Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. (Surveys and assesses analyses of knowing presented after the period covered by Slaght (1977), especially in regard to the Gettier problem; offers a characterization of the problem and sketches a solution mentioned above in §4.)
	Shope, R.K. (1992) ‘Propositional Knowledge’, in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds) A Companion to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, 396–401. (A brief handbook survey of main types of analyses of knowing prior to that offered in Plantinga (1993b), with some consideration of their relation to the Gettier problem.)
	Shope, R.K. (forthcoming) Knowledge as Power. (Completes the sketch in Shope (1981) of a solution to the Gettier problem in the fashion mentioned above in §4 and defends it against critics, including Moser (1989).)
	Slaght, R.L. (1977) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?: A Selective Critical Survey of Recent Work’, Philosophy Research Archives 3: 1–135. (A thorough survey of early literature concerning the Gettier problem.)