Gettier problem

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P022-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved July 16, 2024, from

References and further reading

  • Barker, J. (1976) ‘What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt You?’, The American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4): 303–308.

    (Defeasibility approach mentioned in §2 above, which was the first to deal with misleading defeaters, such as t.)

  • Chisholm R. (1966) Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 3rd edn, 1989.

    (The third edition of this textbook refines earlier research by its author and presents a solution mentioned in §4 above concerning falsehoods.)

  • Feldman, R. (1974) ‘An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1): 68–69.

    (Describes an example mentioned above in §1 not involving falsely believing.)

  • Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23 (6): 121–123; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 35–38.

    (Gettier’s presentation of his own two examples.)

  • Klein, P. (1971) ‘A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy 68 (16): 471–482.

    (A defeasibility analysis presenting the Tom Grabit example mentioned above in §2 that has inspired important variants.)

  • Klein, P. (1981) Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

    (Defends an improvement upon Klein (1971) mentioned in §2 above; relates defeasibility to issues about certainty and scepticism.)

  • Lehrer, K. (1965) ‘Knowledge, Truth, and Evidence’, Analysis 25 (5): 168–175; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 55–66.

    (A defeasibility analysis presenting the Mr Nogot example mentioned above in §2 that has inspired important variants.)

  • Lehrer, K. (1974) Knowledge, London: Oxford University Press.

    (Presents the clever reasoner example mentioned in §1 above, and analyses knowing so as to accommodate it.)

  • Lehrer, K. (1979) ‘The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge’, in G. Pappas (ed.) Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht, Boston, MA, and London: Reidel, 65–78.

    (Presents the tricky Mr Nogot example mentioned in §3 above.)

  • Lehrer, K. (1990) Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO and San Francisco, CA: Westview Press.

    (A textbook refining earlier research by its author.)

  • Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T., Jr. (1969) ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’, The Journal of Philosophy 66 (8): 225–237; repr. in M. Roth and L. Galis (eds) Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge, New York: Random House, 1970, 55–66.

    (Presents a defeasibility analysis and describes a variant of the Tom Grabit example mentioned above in §2.)

  • Moser, P. (1989) Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Presents a defeasibility analysis related to Barker‘s; contains a critique of the solution to the Gettier problem proposed in Shope (1981).)

  • Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Contains a section on epistemology analysing knowing in terms of ‘tracking the truth,’ which involves conditionals including the one mentioned in §3 above.)

  • Plantinga, A. (1993a) Warrant: the Current Debate, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (A thorough survey and critique of contemporary attempts to develop a fourth condition of knowing, which includes counterexamples to Chisholm’s account.)

  • Plantinga, A. (1993b) Warrant and Proper Function, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (Presents the analysis of knowing discussed in §3 above.)

  • Pollock, J.L. (1986) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

    (A textbook including one of the most sophisticated defeasibility analyses, discussed above in §2.)

  • Pollock, J.L. (1992) ‘Reply to Shope’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2): 411–413.

    (Explains how his defeasibility theory relates to introspective knowledge; discussed in §2 above.)

  • Shope, R.K. (1981) The Analysis of Knowing: a Decade of Research, Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.

    (Surveys and assesses analyses of knowing presented after the period covered by Slaght (1977), especially in regard to the Gettier problem; offers a characterization of the problem and sketches a solution mentioned above in §4.)

  • Shope, R.K. (1992) ‘Propositional Knowledge’, in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds) A Companion to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, 396–401.

    (A brief handbook survey of main types of analyses of knowing prior to that offered in Plantinga (1993b), with some consideration of their relation to the Gettier problem.)

  • Shope, R.K. (forthcoming) Knowledge as Power.

    (Completes the sketch in Shope (1981) of a solution to the Gettier problem in the fashion mentioned above in §4 and defends it against critics, including Moser (1989).)

  • Slaght, R.L. (1977) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?: A Selective Critical Survey of Recent Work’, Philosophy Research Archives 3: 1–135.

    (A thorough survey of early literature concerning the Gettier problem.)

Citing this article:
Shope, Robert K.. Bibliography. Gettier problem, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P022-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2024 Routledge.

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