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DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-L036-2
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Published
2020
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L036-2
Version: v2,  Published online: 2020
Retrieved July 16, 2020, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/honour/v-2

Article Summary

Given its psychological and sociological importance, especially in non-liberal societies, honour may be the most undertheorised normative phenomenon. Philosophical neglect of honour is due partly to its doubtful moral bona fides: honour-typical motives have been usually viewed by philosophers in both the Christian and liberal West as either non-moral or immoral but replaced by morally sounder ones. More practically, honour (and what is usually translated into the English ‘honour’) connotes a number of apparently contradictory meanings, further bedevilling analyses. Four particularly salient conceptions of honour emerge in the anthropological, literary, and philosophical research on honour: honour as prestige, honour as the ethos characteristic of ‘cultures of honour’, honour as honestas, and honour as agonism.

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Citing this article:
Demetriou, Dan. Honour, 2020, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L036-2. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/honour/v-2.
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