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Identity of indiscernibles

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-X016-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-X016-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved June 23, 2018, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/identity-of-indiscernibles/v-1

Article Summary

The principle of the identity of indiscernibles states that objects which are alike in all respects are identical. It is sometimes called Leibniz’s Law. This name is also frequently used for the converse principle, the indiscernibility of identicals, that objects which are identical are alike in all respects. Both principles together are sometimes taken to define the concept of identity. Unlike the indiscernibility of identicals, which is widely accepted as a logical truth, the identity of indiscernibles principle has frequently been doubted and rejected. The principle is susceptible of more precise formulation in a number of ways, some more dubitable than others.

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Citing this article:
Simons, Peter. Identity of indiscernibles, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-X016-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/identity-of-indiscernibles/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2018 Routledge.

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