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DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-V017-1
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DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-V017-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/imagination/v-1

Article Summary

‘Imagination’ and ‘imagine’ enjoy a family of meanings, only some of which imply the use of mental imagery. If I ask you to imagine a red flower, I will likely be inviting you to form an image. But if, for example, I say that I imagine that I will go to the party after taking a nap, I am not obviously giving voice to mental imagery. A variety of questions has arisen concerning imagination in its various forms, of which the following four are central. How do internal acts of imagining come to be about particular external objects and states of affairs, actual and non-actual? How are perceptual acts similar to and different from the central cases of imagining? To what extent does routine perception and cognition use similar cognitive resources to creative imagination? Are there any cognitive pursuits in which imagination can play a justificatory role?

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    Citing this article:
    O'Leary-Hawthorne, J.. Imagination, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V017-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/imagination/v-1.
    Copyright © 1998-2018 Routledge.

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