Infinity in ethics

References and further reading

	Barrett, J. and Arntzenius, F. (1999) ‘An infinite decision puzzle’, Theory and Decision 46: 101–103. (Introduces the final puzzle about dollar bills and infinitely divisible time.)
	Hamkins, J. and Montero, B. (2000) ‘With Infinite Utility, More Needn’t be Better’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 231–240. (Argues against the principle identified in the text for assessing outcomes when the future is infinitely long. It also contains many references to recent work on this problem.)
	Keisler, H.J. (1976) Elementary Calculus, Boston, MA: Prindle, Weber & Schmidt. (Chapter 1 provides the best intuitive introduction to non-standard infinite and infinitesimal numbers.)
	Landesman, C. (1995) ‘When to Terminate a Charitable Trust?’, Analysis 55 (1): 12–13. (Lays out the puzzle case where postponing gains makes greater gains possible, and thus no choice is maximally valuable.)
	Nelson, M. (1991) ‘Utilitarian Eschatology’, American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4): 339–347. (Lays out the problem for utilitarianism and related ethical theories of assessing actions when the future is infinitely long.)
	Robinson, A. (1966) Non-Standard Analysis, Amsterdam: North Holland. (Lays out the author’s proofs that one can recognize the existence of infinitesimals. Technical mathematics.)
	Slote, M. (1989) Beyond Optimizing, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Defends the view that morality requires only satisficing.)
	Sorensen, R. (1993) ‘Infinite Decision Theory’, in J. Jordan (ed.) Gambling with God, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. (This highly accessible survey addresses some of the issues that arise in decision theory when pay-offs are infinite or when there are infinitely many finite pay-offs.)
	Vallentyne, P. (1993) ‘Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 212–217. (Defends the principle identified in the text for assessing outcomes when the future is infinitely long. Also contains many references to earlier work by economists and philosophers on this problem.)
	Vallentyne, P. and Kagan, S. (1997) ‘Infinite Utility and Finitely Additive Value Theory’, Journal of Philosophy 94: 5–26. (An abstract generalization of the core idea of Vallentyne (1993). Contains references to criticism of and replies to that article.)