Introspection, psychology of

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-W019-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved September 21, 2019, from

References and further reading

  • Armstrong, D.M. (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge.

    (Discussion of the nature and epistemic status of introspection in the context of a defence of central state materialism. Presents arguments mentioned in §§3, 4.)

  • Churchland, P.M. (1985) Matter and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Chapter 4 includes several arguments against the infallibility of introspective awareness.)

  • Comte, A. (1830) Introduction to Positive Philosophy, trans. and ed. F. Ferre, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988.

    (The classic statement of objections to the possibility and reliability of introspection.)

  • Danziger, K. (1980) ‘The History of Introspection Reconsidered’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 16: 241–262.

    (A useful discussion of the history of introspective psychology with emphasis on the period from 1880 to 1914.)

  • Dennett, D.C. (1978) ‘Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness’, in Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Sketch of an information-processing model of consciousness, including an account of introspection.)

  • Descartes, R. (1641) ‘Meditationes de prima philosophia’, in Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. 7, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Paris: CNRS/Vrin, 1964; trans. ‘Meditations on First Philosophy, including Objections and Replies’, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2, ed. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

    (The classical philosophical treatment of consciousness and introspection.)

  • Dretske, F. (1993) ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind 102: 263–283.

    (Presents argument mentioned in §3.)

  • Ericsson, K.A. and Simon, H.A. (1980) Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; revised edn, 1993.

    (A classical cognitive science treatment of the reliability of introspective verbal reports.)

  • Farthing, G.W. (1992) The Psychology of Consciousness, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    (A useful psychology text on consciousness, with two chapters on introspection.)

  • Hill, C. (1991) Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (An interesting treatment of introspection which emphasizes its active nature.)

  • Howe, R.B.K. (1991) ‘Introspection: A Reassessment’, New Ideas in Psychology 9: 25–44.

    (A defence of introspection as a method in psychology.)

  • James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology, New York: Holt.

    (Chapter 7, volume 2 includes James’ response to Comte, discussed in §4.)

  • Locke, J. (1689) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, with notes by A.C. Fraser, New York: Dover, 1959.

    (The classical statement of the view that introspection is a form of perception.)

  • Lycan, W. (1995) ‘Consciousness as Internal Monitoring’, in Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ch. 2.

    (Defends the Lockean view that introspection is inner sense, mentioned in §3, against numerous objections.)

  • Lyons, W. (1986) The Disappearance of Introspection, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (A useful overview of the various historical and contemporary views on introspection.)

  • Mill, J.S. (1865) Auguste Comte and Positivism, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1968.

    (Includes Mill’s response to Comte’s arguments mentioned in §4.)

  • Nisbett, R. and Wilson, T. (1977) ‘Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes’, Psychological Review 84 (3): 231–259.

    (An extensive review of the psychological literature that argues that people are often unaware of what causes their actions.)

  • Rosenthal, D.M. (1986) ‘Two Concepts of Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies 49: 329–359.

    (Contrasts the Cartesian and a non-Cartesian conception of consciousness.)

  • Rosenthal, D.M. (1993) ‘Thinking that One Thinks’, in M. Davies (ed.) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (Develops an argument for the higher-order thought view of consciousness.)

  • Sekuler, R. and Blake, R. (1994) Perception, New York: McGraw-Hill.

    (A good recent textbook on psychophysics.)

  • Shoemaker, S. (1994) ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 249–315.

    (An extended argument against the view that introspection is a form of perception. Presents arguments mentioned in §3.)

  • Stevens, S.S. (1951) A Handbook of Experimental Psychology, New York: Wiley & Sons.

    (A classic contemporary anthology including works in psychophysics.)

  • White, P.A. (1988) ‘Knowing More About What We Can Tell: “Introspective Access” and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later’, British Journal of Psychology 79: 13–45.

    (A review of the literature published in response to Nisbett and Wilson (1977) that calls some of their conclusions into question.)

Citing this article:
Von Eckhardt, Barbara. Bibliography. Introspection, psychology of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-W019-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
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