Introspection, psychology of

References and further reading

	Armstrong, D.M. (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge. (Discussion of the nature and epistemic status of introspection in the context of a defence of central state materialism. Presents arguments mentioned in §§3, 4.)
	Churchland, P.M. (1985) Matter and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Chapter 4 includes several arguments against the infallibility of introspective awareness.)
	Comte, A. (1830) Introduction to Positive Philosophy, trans. and ed. F. Ferre, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988. (The classic statement of objections to the possibility and reliability of introspection.)
	Danziger, K. (1980) ‘The History of Introspection Reconsidered’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 16: 241–262. (A useful discussion of the history of introspective psychology with emphasis on the period from 1880 to 1914.)
	Dennett, D.C. (1978) ‘Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness’, in Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Sketch of an information-processing model of consciousness, including an account of introspection.)
	Descartes, R. (1641) ‘Meditationes de prima philosophia’, in Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. 7, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Paris: CNRS/Vrin, 1964; trans. ‘Meditations on First Philosophy, including Objections and Replies’, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2, ed. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. (The classical philosophical treatment of consciousness and introspection.)
	Dretske, F. (1993) ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind 102: 263–283. (Presents argument mentioned in §3.)
	Ericsson, K.A. and Simon, H.A. (1980) Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; revised edn, 1993. (A classical cognitive science treatment of the reliability of introspective verbal reports.)
	Farthing, G.W. (1992) The Psychology of Consciousness, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. (A useful psychology text on consciousness, with two chapters on introspection.)
	Hill, C. (1991) Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (An interesting treatment of introspection which emphasizes its active nature.)
	Howe, R.B.K. (1991) ‘Introspection: A Reassessment’, New Ideas in Psychology 9: 25–44. (A defence of introspection as a method in psychology.)
	James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology, New York: Holt. (Chapter 7, volume 2 includes James’ response to Comte, discussed in §4.)
	Locke, J. (1689) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, with notes by A.C. Fraser, New York: Dover, 1959. (The classical statement of the view that introspection is a form of perception.)
	Lycan, W. (1995) ‘Consciousness as Internal Monitoring’, in Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ch. 2. (Defends the Lockean view that introspection is inner sense, mentioned in §3, against numerous objections.)
	Lyons, W. (1986) The Disappearance of Introspection, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (A useful overview of the various historical and contemporary views on introspection.)
	Mill, J.S. (1865) Auguste Comte and Positivism, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1968. (Includes Mill’s response to Comte’s arguments mentioned in §4.)
	Nisbett, R. and Wilson, T. (1977) ‘Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes’, Psychological Review 84 (3): 231–259. (An extensive review of the psychological literature that argues that people are often unaware of what causes their actions.)
	Rosenthal, D.M. (1986) ‘Two Concepts of Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies 49: 329–359. (Contrasts the Cartesian and a non-Cartesian conception of consciousness.)
	Rosenthal, D.M. (1993) ‘Thinking that One Thinks’, in M. Davies (ed.) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Blackwell. (Develops an argument for the higher-order thought view of consciousness.)
	Sekuler, R. and Blake, R. (1994) Perception, New York: McGraw-Hill. (A good recent textbook on psychophysics.)
	Shoemaker, S. (1994) ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 249–315. (An extended argument against the view that introspection is a form of perception. Presents arguments mentioned in §3.)
	Stevens, S.S. (1951) A Handbook of Experimental Psychology, New York: Wiley & Sons. (A classic contemporary anthology including works in psychophysics.)
	White, P.A. (1988) ‘Knowing More About What We Can Tell: “Introspective Access” and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later’, British Journal of Psychology 79: 13–45. (A review of the literature published in response to Nisbett and Wilson (1977) that calls some of their conclusions into question.)