Libertarianism

3. Philosophical foundations

Although it is possible to state a ’core’ libertarian view, many different philosophical foundations for it have been offered. Consequently the details of the views defended have significant differences too: for example, opinions differ about whether libertarians can allow people to opt out of market society into, say, socialism if that is what they prefer. The following, used alone or in combination, are perhaps the most important lines of defence of the doctrine.

The best-known approach, that associated with Robert Nozick (§2), is to try to justify libertarianism in terms of a doctrine of natural rights to self-ownership: as I have the right to determine the course of my own life (provided I respect the similar rights of others), I have no enforceable obligations to others unless I have brought these on myself by my own voluntary action. If a government makes me contribute to the alleviation of the plight of the needy, or forces me to act against my will, then it behaves as if it is part-owner of me, and so violates my right to self-ownership. An important variant of rights-based libertarianism justifies rights not in terms of self-ownership, but in terms of human flourishing. Here the central claim is that only in a libertarian society can a life fully worthy of human beings be achieved.

A second style of justification has greater affinities with consequentialist reasoning. Libertarian society is, at least in part, justified by the economic efficiency of market society. Interventions in the free market are criticized on the grounds that they will impede enterprise, distort incentives and thus diminish the effectiveness of the market. This type of approach does, however, allow some room for guarded government intervention to ensure the smooth running of the market and to prevent the formation of monopolies. The state also has the role of supplying ‘public goods’, in the technical sense, such as street lighting or a pollution-free atmosphere, which the market is notoriously poor at producing. This type of consequentialist libertarianism thus has a reason for permitting certain government activities which would be prohibited by pure rights-based libertarianism.

A third approach tries to justify libertarianism by means of a hypothetical contract. First we posit a hypothetical ’state of nature’ in which individuals, considered as holders of private property, subsist alone or in family groups. It is recognized, however, that social cooperation would produce benefits for all. Accordingly, individuals come together to draw up terms of association. All have a reason to accept legally enforceable rights and duties of non-interference, and, perhaps, duties of emergency aid. However, the rich and powerful, who are in the stronger bargaining position, have reason to resist any more extensive duties, and so this limits the agreement that can be achieved. Nevertheless, certain further functions of governments could be seen as agreed to in this context. In particular, governments may tax individuals to supply public goods.

A fourth approach takes as its starting point subjectivism about values. In this way libertarianism is represented as the only morally neutral society. A society which redistributes income appears to subscribe to the value of ’need-satisfaction’. But if the wealthy do not accept this value, then to engage in redistribution is to force people to live according to values they do not hold, and so is a form of tyranny. Those who do value the alleviation of others’ distress are at perfect liberty to do whatever they want with their own property. But there should be no compulsion to subscribe to this value or to any other.

A fifth approach, less common, is inspired by a point from Kant’s moral philosophy. It begins with Kant’s distinction between actions performed for the sake of duty and actions performed in accordance with duty (see Kant, I. §10). If we believe that only the former have moral worth, then an extensive set of legally enforceable duties removes the scope of true virtue: if I am forced to transfer some money to you by law, then, while it may be an action performed in accordance with duty, it has not been done for the sake of duty, but out of coercion, and hence there is no moral worth in my action. This form of libertarianism, then, recommends a slimmed-down state to make virtue possible. (It should be noted that Kant himself did not draw these political conclusions from his moral philosophy.)