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Many-valued logics

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-Y047-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-Y047-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved November 22, 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/many-valued-logics/v-1

Article Summary

Many-valued logics may be distinguished from classical logic on purely semantic grounds. One of the simplifying assumptions on which classical logic is based is the thesis of bivalence, which states that there are only two truth-values – true and false – and every sentence must be one or the other. Many-valued logics reject the thesis of bivalence and permit more than two truth-values.

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Citing this article:
Morgan, Charles G.. Many-valued logics, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-Y047-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/many-valued-logics/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2019 Routledge.

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