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Mental states, adverbial theory of

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-V002-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-V002-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved June 20, 2018, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mental-states-adverbial-theory-of/v-1

Article Summary

According to the adverbial theory, there are no mental objects of experience, no pains, itches, tickles, after-images, appearances. People certainly feel pains and have after-images; external objects certainly present appearances to people viewing them. But pains, after-images, and appearances are not real things. Statements which purport to be about such mental objects have a misleading grammatical form. In reality, such statements are about the ways in which people experience or sense or feel.

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Citing this article:
Tye, Michael. Mental states, adverbial theory of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V002-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mental-states-adverbial-theory-of/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2018 Routledge.

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