DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-V002-1
Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved March 24, 2023, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mental-states-adverbial-theory-of/v-1
Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved March 24, 2023, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mental-states-adverbial-theory-of/v-1
Article Summary
According to the adverbial theory, there are no mental objects of experience, no pains, itches, tickles, after-images, appearances. People certainly feel pains and have after-images; external objects certainly present appearances to people viewing them. But pains, after-images, and appearances are not real things. Statements which purport to be about such mental objects have a misleading grammatical form. In reality, such statements are about the ways in which people experience or sense or feel.
Citing this article:
Tye, Michael. Mental states, adverbial theory of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V002-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mental-states-adverbial-theory-of/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2023 Routledge.
Tye, Michael. Mental states, adverbial theory of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V002-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/mental-states-adverbial-theory-of/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2023 Routledge.