Bird, A. (2014) ‘When is there a group that knows’, in J. Lackey (ed.) Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42–62.
(Defends the existence of irreducible group knowledge.)
Block, N. (1980) ‘What is functionalism?’, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology 1, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 171–84.
(An excellent survey article on functionalism which also draws a useful distinction between ontology and metaphysics.)
Carter, A. and J. Kallestrup (2016) ‘Extended cognition and propositional memory’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3): 691–714.
(Explores various arguments for the existence of extended knowledge.)
Cassam, Q. (2007) ‘Ways of knowing’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1): 339–58.
(Discusses the claim that propositional seeing is a way of coming to know, as opposed to a way of knowing.)
Chalmers, D. and A. Clark (1998) ‘The extended mind’, Analysis 58 (1): 7–19.
(One of the most highly cited philosophy articles of all time, introducing the extended mind hypothesis.)
Clark, A. (2008) Supersizing the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A book-length defence of the extended mind hypothesis).
Conee, E. and R. Feldman (2004) Evidentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Defends mentalist evidentialism according to which justification is a function of evidence, which in turn consists of mental states and processes.)
Fine, K. (2001) ‘The question of realism’, Philosophers’ Imprint 1 (1): 1–30.
(Argues that our metaphysical concept of reality is primitive and fundamental, and that questions of what is real are to be settled on the basis of metaphysical ground.)
Frege, G. (1918) ‘Der Gedanke: eine logische Untersuchung’, in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1918–1919), 58–77. Transl. by P. Geach and R. Stoothoff as ‘Thoughts’, in B. McGuinness (ed.) Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984, 351–72.
(A famous article arguing that thoughts are abstract entities, and in particular that facts are true thoughts.)
French, G. (2012) ‘Does propositional seeing entail propositional knowledge?’, Theoria 78 (2), 115–27.
(Replies to Turri’s argument in (2010) that there are cases in which an agent sees that p without knowing that p.)
Fricker, E. (2009) ‘Is knowing a state of mind? The case against’, in D. Pritchard and P. Greenough (eds) Williamson on Knowldge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 31–59.
(Argues that while Williamson (2000) removes some obstacles to accepting knowing as a fully mental state, there are still strong grounds to resist this claim.)
Funkhouser, E. (2006) ‘The determinable-determinate relation’, Noûs 40 (3), 548–69.
(Develops the metaphysical determination relation in detail.)
Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is justified true belief knowledge’, Analysis 23 (6), 121–3.
(An epoch-making short article which demonstrates that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge.)
Goldberg, S. (2010) Relying on Others, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Develops and defends a social-reliabilist epistemology according to which testimonial knowledge is acquired through relying on cognitive processes that extend beyond the boundaries of the agent.)
Goldman, A. (1979) ‘What Is justified belief?', in G.S. Pappas (ed.) Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1–25.
(A highly influential article which introduces a reliabilist account of justified belief.)
Goldman, A. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Further develops reliabilism in epistemology against the background of scientific discoveries in cognitive science.)
Holton, R. (Unpublished manuscript) 'Facts, factives and contra-factives', available at http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/rjh221/pubs.html (accessed September 26, 2016).
(Discusses whether factive verbs such as ‘knowledge’ take facts, as opposed to true propositions, as their objects.)
Hossack, K. (2007) The Metaphysics of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Presents the thesis that knowledge is a fundamental relation, which plays an indispensable role in metaphysics and in philosophy of mind and language.)
Kallestrup, J. and D. Pritchard (2012) ‘Robust virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1): 84–103.
(Argues that what turns true belief into testimonial knowledge depends on social features of the communicative exchanges.)
Kornblith, H. (2007) ‘The metaphysical status of knowledge’, in E. Sosa and E. Villanueva (eds) The Metaphysics of Epistemology, Philosophical Issues 17, Oxford: Blackwell, 145–64.
(Argues from the perspective of naturalized epistemology that knowledge is a natural kind.)
Lackey, J. (2014) ‘A deflationary account of group testimony’, in J. Lackey (ed.) Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 65–91.
(Argues that groups can have knowledge that none of their members have.)
Lehrer, K. (1997) Self Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(Argues that epistemic properties fail to supervene on non-epistemic properties.)
Lehrer, K. and T. Paxson (1969) ‘Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief’, Journal of Philosophy 66 (8), 225–37.
(Defends the claim that knowledge is undefeated justified true belief.)
Nagel, J. (2013) ‘Knowledge as a mental state’, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4: 275–310.
(Examines the reasons why psychologists have typically classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers have not.)
Pettit, P. and D Schweikard (2006) ‘Joint actions and group agents’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1), 18–39.
(Develops notions of joint agency and group agency.)
Plantinga, A. (1993) Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Defines warrant as that which converts true belief into knowledge, and then argues that warrant is the product of a properly functioning cognitive process.)
Pritchard, D. (2010) ‘Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis’, Synthese 175 (1): 133–51.
(The first article to defend the claim that extended cognitive abilities generate knowledge.)
Pryor, J. (2000) ‘The sceptic and the dogmatist’, Noûs 34 (4), 517–49.
(An important article which formulates an epistemology of perception based on dogmatism about justification.)
Pryor, J.( 2004) ‘What's wrong with Moore's argument?’, Philosophical Issues 14 (1), 349–78.
(Offers a diagnosis of what could be wrong with G.E. Moore’s anti-sceptical argument.)
Schaffer, J. (2012) ‘Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity’, in F. Correia and B. Schneider (eds) Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 122–38.
(Provides counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding, understood as a kind of metaphysical causation.)
Schmitt, F. (1994) ‘The justification of group beliefs’, in F. Schmitt (ed.) Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 257–87.
(Argues that so-called chartered groups are capable of possessing irreducible group knowledge.)
Shoemaker, S. (2007) Physical Realisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Offers an account of realization according to which mental properties of an agent are both causally efficacious and realized in microphysical properties of that agent.)
Shope, R.K. (1983) The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
(Discusses at length proposed analyses of many Gettier cases.)
Sosa, E. (2007) A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as distinctive cognitive achievements.)
Sosa, E. (2015) Judgement and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Extends Sosa’s earlier virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge to include the role of the will in judgment and issues of epistemic evaluation).
Treanor, N. (2013) ‘The measure of knowledge’, Noûs 47 (3), 577–601.
(Offers an account of how one agent can be said at a time to know more than another agent).
Turri, J. (2010) ‘Does perceiving entail knowing?’, Theoria 76 (3), 197–206.
(Argues that there are cases in which an agent sees that p without knowing that p.)
Williamson, T. (1995) ‘Is knowing a state of mind?’, Mind 104 (415): 533–65.
(The first article to argue that knowledge is a mental state.)
Williamson, T. (2000) Knowledge and its Limit, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A book-length defence of the primacy of knowledge as a sui generis mental state over any state that falls short of knowledge.)
Williamson, T. (2013) Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(By applying the technical resources of modal logic, this monograph provides answers to metaphysical questions about the nature of being and its relations to contingency and change.)
Wilson, J. (2009) ‘Determination, realisation and mental causation’, Philosophical Studies 145 (1), 149–69.
(Argues that mental-physical realization can be understood on the model of the determination of determinables by their determinates.)
Wilson, J. (2014) ‘No work for a theory of grounding’, Inquiry 57 (5/6), 535–79.
(Argues that grounding should be understood in terms of specific metaphysical relations, such as type identity or functional realization, rather than a distinctive metaphysical relation.)
Wilson, R. (2001) ‘Two views of realisation’, Philosophical Studies 104 (1), 1–31.
(Discusses the common conception of realization whereby realizations are determinative of the properties they realize and physically constitutive of agents with those properties.)