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Blackburn, S. (1998) Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A prominent defence of noncognitivism, arguing that it can accommodate the objectivity-presupposing character of moral judgement.) |
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Dancy, J. (2004) Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A defence of holism about moral reasons and particularism about moral principles, rejecting the idea that the justification of moral judgement requires the provision of principles.) |
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Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Another prominent defence of noncognitivism as compatible with the presupposition of objectivity.) |
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Hare, R. M. (1981) Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A utilitarian account of the role of ‘rules of thumb’ in moral deliberation, backed by an underlying verdictive moral principle.) |
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Herman, B. (1993) The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Collection of essays developing a Kantian account of moral judgement as exercised in thinking about reasons whose importance derives from an underlying moral principle, namely Kant’s categorical imperative.) |
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Larmore, C. (1981) ‘Moral Judgment’, Review of Metaphysics
35: 275–296. (Argues against treating moral deliberation as rule-governed.) |
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McDowell, J. (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, Monist
63: 331–350. (A defence of cognitivism and the need for the virtue of moral judgement for the possession of moral knowledge.) |
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McDowell, J. (1981) ‘Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following’, in S. H.
Holtzman and C. M.
Leich (eds) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 141–162. (Appeals to Wittgensteinian considerations about rule-following in support of a form of moral cognitivism.) |
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Rawls, J. (1980) ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, Journal of Philosophy
77: 515–572. (An influential statement of Kantian constructivism as an alternative to understanding moral judgement as either fact-recognition or response-expression.) |
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Richardson, H. (1990) ‘Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems’, Philosophy & Public Affairs
19: 270–310. (A presentation of the view that moral deliberation should aim at the progressive refinement of verdictive principles.) |
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Ross, W. D. (1930) The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Chapter 2, ‘What Makes Right Acts Right?’, is a classic presentation of the view that the determinative justification of moral judgement rests on a set of contributory principles.) |
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Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008)(ed.), Moral Psychology, 3 vols, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Interdisciplinary collection of recent work discussing the empirical data about moral judgement and their significance for philosophy.) |