Brink, D. (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(The only book-length presentation of American realism.)
Dancy, J. (1993) Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell.
(A recent full-scale expression of British realism.)
Darwall, S., Gibbard, A. and Railton, P. (1992) ‘Towards Fin de Siècle Ethics’, Philosophical Review 101 (1): 115–89.
(An advanced survey of late twentieth-century ethics.)
Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 1.
(An influential introductory text.)
Little, M. (1995) ‘Recent Work in Moral Realism’, Philosophical Books 35 (3): 145–53; 35 (4): 225–33.
(A two-part comparison of British and American realism.)
Mackie, J. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin, ch.1.
(A very influential introductory text, which starts by attempting to undermine realism.)
Dowell, J. (1978) ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary vol. 52: 13–29.
(Gives reasons for rejecting a Humean conception of moral motivation.)
Dowell, J. (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist 62: 331–50.
(Attacks ‘subsumptive’ accounts of moral rationality, in favour of ‘perceptual’ ones.)
Dowell, J. (1985) ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in T.
Honderich (ed.) Morality and Objectivity, London: Routledge, 110–29.
(Gives a dispositional account of normativity in the world, appealing to the analogy with secondary qualities.)
Pettit, P. (1992) ‘Realism’, in J.
Dancy and E.
Sosa (eds) A Companion to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, 420–4.
(An accessible account of what it is to be a realist in any area, which sees realism as a complex combination of claims; the present entry is much influenced by Pettit’s account.)
Wiggins, D. (1987) ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, in Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, Oxford: Blackwell.
(This and the other papers in the work represent the ethical thought of another leading British realist.)
Wright, C. (1992) Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Sets out Wright’s sophisticated conception of how the debate between realists and their opponents should be conducted, in a way that focuses on, but is not at all restricted to, moral realism.)