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Moral realism

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-L059-1
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DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L059-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved October 21, 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/moral-realism/v-1

References and further reading

  • Brink, D. (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (The only book-length presentation of American realism.)

  • Dancy, J. (1993) Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (A recent full-scale expression of British realism.)

  • Darwall, S., Gibbard, A. and Railton, P. (1992) ‘Towards Fin de Siècle Ethics’, Philosophical Review 101 (1): 115–89.

    (An advanced survey of late twentieth-century ethics.)

  • Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 1.

    (An influential introductory text.)

  • Little, M. (1995) ‘Recent Work in Moral Realism’, Philosophical Books 35 (3): 145–53; 35 (4): 225–33.

    (A two-part comparison of British and American realism.)

  • Mackie, J. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin, ch.1.

    (A very influential introductory text, which starts by attempting to undermine realism.)

  • Mc Dowell, J. (1978) ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplementary vol. 52: 13–29.

    (Gives reasons for rejecting a Humean conception of moral motivation.)

  • Mc Dowell, J. (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist 62: 331–50.

    (Attacks ‘subsumptive’ accounts of moral rationality, in favour of ‘perceptual’ ones.)

  • Mc Dowell, J. (1985) ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in T. Honderich (ed.) Morality and Objectivity, London: Routledge, 110–29.

    (Gives a dispositional account of normativity in the world, appealing to the analogy with secondary qualities.)

  • Pettit, P. (1992) ‘Realism’, in J. Dancy and E. Sosa (eds) A Companion to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, 420–4.

    (An accessible account of what it is to be a realist in any area, which sees realism as a complex combination of claims; the present entry is much influenced by Pettit’s account.)

  • Wiggins, D. (1987) ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, in Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (This and the other papers in the work represent the ethical thought of another leading British realist.)

  • Wright, C. (1992) Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Sets out Wright’s sophisticated conception of how the debate between realists and their opponents should be conducted, in a way that focuses on, but is not at all restricted to, moral realism.)

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Citing this article:
Dancy, Jonathan. Bibliography. Moral realism, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L059-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/moral-realism/v-1/bibliography/moral-realism-bib.
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