Naturalized epistemology

References and further reading

	Armstrong, D.M. (1973) Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Referred to in §2 above. A difficult, technically sophisticated but groundbreaking defence of an externalist theory of knowledge.)
	Bon Jour, L. (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Discussed above in §2. Important and highly accessible defence of an internalist approach to the theory of knowledge.)
	Campbell, D.T. (1974) ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Popper, bk 1, La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Referred to in §4 above. Helpful account of the field of evolutionary epistemology.)
	Churchland, P. (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Discussed in §2 above. Reasonably accessible and influential attack on the idea that knowledge is ‘sentences suitably related’.)
	Feyerabend, P.K. (1986) Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Discussed in §3 above. Demanding essays in the philosophy of science.)
	Goldman, A. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Discussed above in §4. Reasonably accessible and influential defence of a moderately naturalized epistemology.)
	Hanson, N.R. (1968) Patterns of Discovery: An Enquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Discussed in §3. Accessible introduction to the philosophy of science.)
	Harman, G. (1986) Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Discussed in §2 above. Highly accessible defence of a moderately accessible naturalized epistemology.)
	Hume, D. (1748/51) Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised P.H. Niddich, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3rd edn, 1975. (Referred to in §2 above. Accessible and extremely influential.)
	Kitchener, R.F. (1986) Piaget’s Theory of Knowledge: Genetic Epistemology and Scientific Reason, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Exhaustive discussion of genetic epistemology.)
	Kornblith, H. (1985) Naturalizing Epistemology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Contains an introductory essay which defends the idea that the distinctive feature of naturalized epistemology is its position on the relationship between the normative question of how we ought we to arrive at our beliefs, and the descriptive issue of how we do we arrive at our beliefs. Also contains leading naturalist essays and an exhaustive bibliography up to 1984. Most of the material is accessible to non-specialists.)
	Kornblith, H. (1993) Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Accessible and lucid explanation of inductive inference from the perspective of naturalistic epistemology.)
	Luper- Foy, S. (1990) ‘Arbitrary Reasons’, in Doubting, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Referred to above in §6. Argues that it is rational to accept arbitrary beliefs.)
	Nisbett, R. and Ross, L. (1980) Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Referred to in §5 above. Accessible survey of literature on irrationality.)
	Quine, W.V. (1953) ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper Torchbooks. (Referred to in §4 above. Spells out much of the theory that suggested naturalized epistemology. Most of it is accessible.)
	Quine, W.V. (1969) ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in Ontological Relativity & Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press. (Referred to in §§2 and 4. The definitive essay of naturalized epistemology. Accessible.)
	Quine, W.V. (1974) The Roots of Reference, La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Referred to above in §1. Discusses induction and hints at an externalist refutation of scepticism. Accessible.)
	Quine, W.V. (1992) Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Referred to in §5 above. Section 8 of this book elaborates (in the minimalist fashion typical of Quine) on the role of normativity in naturalized epistemology.)
	Stich, S. (1988) ‘Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity’, Synthese 74 (3): 391–415. (Discussed above in §5. Defends a pragmatic approach to belief management. Accessible.)
	Taylor, S. (1989) Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind, New York: Basic Books. (Referred to in §5 above. Very accessible argument for the claim that self-deception is adaptive.)